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Supreme Court No 35312135373
Volunie 2
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO

CARY SARGENT
PlaintiffIAppellant
VS

DOYLE BECK
DefendantiRespondent
And

MARK FULLER

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC
PlaintiffIAppellant

CARY SARGENT AND GLENDALE CONSTRUCTION,
INC.
DefendantiRespondent

Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
For Fremont County
Honorable Brent J. Moss District Judge
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William Fahler, Esq.
PO Box 501 30
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Attorney for Plaintiff1
Appellant - Cary Sargent

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
8.4. Driscoll, Esq.
PO Box 50731
Attorney for Plaintiff1
Appellent - H i g l Valley
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Exhibit "B"
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William D. Falor, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No.1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
m
i
n
x Address:
P.0.Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-01 30
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208)523-95 1 8

I

Attorneysfir Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVHNTH JUDICIAL DISTFUCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TKECOUNTY OF PRaMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company

Case No. CV-02-00484

Plaintiff,
THIRD PARTY C
W OF
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN &

VS.

CARY SAROENT,
-

--

_- _ - -Defendant.
-_ _ --_

.-

_

__

.

-

.

-

-

-
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COMES NOW,Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C., and hereby submits its third
I

I

party claim in response to the Writ of Execution and Notice of Attachment isued in this matter

1

I
1

and served on behalf of Doyle Beck againat Cary Sargt, attadhg the following:

"Amended Judgment in Fremont County Case No. CV-07-0118 filed in chatnbers
in Madison County on March 3 1,2008, in the faoe amount of$82,220.13."
Deacrlption of Third Party Claim:

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. has a prior "intimen seourity interest on all
property of Cary Sargcnt inaluding the judgment he obtained against Doyle Beck in Fremont
County Case No.CV-07-0 118 which is bsubject of the Notice of Attachment. A copy of such

3tion to Contest Claim of Exemption and ~hird-partyClaim
Exemption

I!!sYS A l u n o 3 l u o ! J J a l j

nb\~IMh\

WYSO:8

8001 'Il '"V

security agreement is attached as Exhibit "A". The security agreement is secured by the

following:
1.
2,

3.

I

A Mortgage for the real propeaty located in Frernont Counv,
A UCCl Statemeat filed with the Semof State's office, specifically
including any judgment obtained by Cary Sargtnt against Doylc Beck; and
Liens on vehicles owned by Cary Sargent.

This Security Agreement was made to secure payment for legal fees and costs incurred as

l

a result of legal representation provided by HoIdcn, Kidwell, Hnhxl and Crapo, P.L.L.C.to Cmy

I

Sargent. The mount of the legal s c i c a provided is $190,874.58 as submitted in Sargent's
Motion, Memorandum,and Amdavit for Fees in Costs in both matters. Thus, the amount of the

I

third party cltillm protected by the security interest Is c m t l y $190,874.58.

I

Cary Sargemt and M such he is incurring additional fees and costs which are also secured by

Hol&n, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. continues to provide legal representation for

Security Agreement.
--

-

-

--

Therefore,
third party
Holdm, Kidwell, Habn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.hereby quests the
--- -- - --

--

--

--

--

-.

release of the Notice of Attachment dated April 3 2008, and numbered 200801764.
DATeD this @& day of April, 2008.

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapq P.L,L.C
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CLR'XIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my omce in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I s e m d a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand deJivering, by mailin or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereofon this 1(@ ay of April, 2008.
CrC

DOCUMENT SERVED:

4

Third Party Claim of Holden, Kfdwell, Hahn rb Cnpo,
P.L.L.C.

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Bryan D.Smith
B.J. Driscoll

McOrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[ )L) U.S.Mail

[
[
[

] Hand Delivery
] Fahimile
Jother

Nolden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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SECURITY AGREEMENT
t h i s Security Agreement made as of this 26" day of January, 2008, and executed by Cary
Sargent, whose address is 359 North 2400 East, St. Anthony, Idaho 83445, (hereinafter
"Debtor")). Debtor hereby grants to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L,L.C. (hereinafter
"Secured Party"), and to Secured Party's successors and assigns, a security interest in the personal
property together with all replacement thereof and accessories, parts, additions and accessions
now or hereafter affixed or used in connection therewith (hereinafter "Co2lateraI") set forth on
Exhibits A, B,C,D and E.

I,
The security interest granted hereby is to secure payment and performance of the
liabilities and obligations of Debtor to Secured Party of every kind and description, direct or
indirect, absolute or contingent, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising,
specifically including the payment of attorney fees and costs provided to Debtor by Secured Party
(all hereinafter "Obligations").
2.

Debtor hereby warrants and covenants:
a.
Title. Debtor is competent to enter into this Agreement and is now the
owner of the Collateral free from any adverse Ifen, security interest or
encumbrance.

b.

Use. The Collateral is used primarily for Cary Sargent's Business and

Home.
Location of Collateral. The CollateraLwill bg-locatedin-hemont-Coun&
Debtor will not remove the Collateral from said county without the written consent
of Secured Party.
c.

- -

Re~idency.Debtor resides and maintains Debtor's chief place of business
in Fremont County,Idaho.
d,

Fixtures. Some of the Collateral. is to be or has been attached to 4 estate.
Except as otherwise indicated, the parties intend that said Collateral shall always
remain personal property. A legal description o f the real estate is as follows:
e,

Lot 4, Blook 4, Schuldies Subdivision Division 1, Fremont County,
Idaho as shown on the Plat Recorded March 2,1978, as Instnunent
No, 352708, Property Address: 359 North 2400 &st, St. Anthony,
Idaho, Parcel ID Number WOO 149004004A;

The name of the record owner is Caxy Sargent, Debtor will on demand o f Securcd
Party furnish the latter with a disclaimer or disclaimers, signed by all pcrsons
having an interest in the r q l estate, of any interest in the Collateral which is prior
to Secured Party's interest.
Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim
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f.
Perfection of Security Interest. The Debtor agrees to execute and file
financing statements and do whatever may be necessary under applicable law to
perfect and continue the Secured Party's interest in the Collateral, dl at Debtor's
expense.
Sale Prohibited. Debtor will not sell or offer to sell or otherwise transfer
g,
the Collateral or any interest therein without the written consent of Secured Party.
Byclaiming proceeds or products of the Collateral in any financing statement
prepared in conjunction with this Security Agreement, the Secured Party shall not
be deemed to have given Debtor m implied power to sell or otherwise transfer the
Collateral or any interest therein.

h,

Ineurance, Debtor will in his discretion keep the Collateral insured by an
insurer approved by Secured Party against fire, theft and other hazards designated
at any time by Secured Party, in an amount equal to the full insurable value
thereof or to all sums secured hereby, with such form of loss payable clause as
designated by and in favor of Secured Party, and will deliver the policies and
receipts showing payment of premiums to the Secured Party. In the event of loss,
Secured Party shall have fbll power to collect any and all insurance upon the
Collateral and to apply the same at its option to any obligation secured hereby,
whether or not matured, or to the restoration or repair of the property. Secured
Party sMl have no liability whatsoever for any lose that may occur by reason of
the omission or lack of coverage of any such insurance.
-

.

- -

--

-

i.
Adverse Liens and Use. Debtor will keep the CollateraI free from any
adverse Iicn,-sccurity interest or encumbrance exocptto the extent such liens,
security interest or encumbrance currently exists. Debtor will not create nor
permit the existence of any adverse lien, security interest or encumbrance other
than that created hereby on the property without the written consent of Secured
Party. Any certificate of title now or hereafter existing on any of the property will
be delivered to Secured Party and will recite the interest of Secured Party. Debtor
will keep the Collateral in good order and repair and will not waste or destroy the
Collatera.ator any past thereof. Debtor will not use or permit anyone to use, the
Collateral in violation of any statute, ordinance, or state or federal regulation; and
Secured Party may examine and inspect the Collateral at any reasonable time,
wherever located,

Taxes and Assessments. Debtor will pay promptly when due all taxes
j.
and assessments upon the Collateral or for its use or operation or upon this
Agreement or upon any note or notes evidencing the obligation.
3.
Purchase Money. To tlie extent the proceeds of any note shall be used to acquire
said Collateral, Secured Party shall have a purchase money security interest therein. Debtor

I

2

-

Security Agreement

Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim
of Exemption
Page 206

j j ! Has h1uno03

1u0ualj

WV90:8

800Z ' I l d V
' J

f,

hereby authorizes Secured Party to disburse said procceds to the seller of the CoHateral andlor to
the insurance agent or broker, as shown on the records of the Secured Party.
Secured Party's Right to Pay Taxes, Etc.; Debtor's Right to Possession, The
4,
Secured Party is not required to, but may, at its option discharge taxes, liens or security interests
or other encumbrances at any time levied or placed on the Collateral, pay for insurance on the
Collateral, pay for the maintenance and preservation of the Collateral, pay any filing or recording
fees, or any other charges payable by Debtor and any amount so paid, with interest thereon at the
maximum rate permitted by law from date of payment until repaid shall be secured hereby and
shall be repayable by Debtor on demand. The ri&$ granted by this paragraph are not a waiver of
any other rights of Secured Party arising from breach of any of the covenants hereby by Debtor.
a.
Until Default Debtor may have possession of the Collateral and use it in
any lawful manner not inconsistent with this Agreement and not inconsistent with
any policy of insurance thereon.

5.
Default. Time is of the essence of this Security Agreement, and Debtor shall be
in default under this Agreement upon the happening of any of the following events or conditions:

Default in the payment or performance of any obligation, covenant or
liability contained or referred to herein or in any note evidencing the same;

a,

Any warranty, representation or statement made or f d s h e d to Secured
b,
Party by or on behalf of Debtor proves to have been false in any material respect
when made or furnished;

-

-

-. -

-

-

- .-

-.

a

c.
Any event which results in the acceleration o f the maturity of the
indebtedness of Debtor to others under any indentwe agreement or undertaking;

Loss, theft, damage, destruction, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the
Collateral, or the making of any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon;
d.

e,
Death,dissolution, termination of existence, insolvcncy, business fdure,
appointment of a recefver of any part of the property of, assignment for the benefit
of crcditors by, or the commencement of any proceeding under any bankruptcy or
insolvency laws by or against, Debtor of any guarantor or surety for Debtor, or
entry of any judgment against them, or fdlure of any guarantor or surety for
Debtor to provide Secured Party with financial Wormation promptly when
requested by Secured Party.

I

3

-

The S e c w d Party deems itself insecure,

Seeurlty Agreement

Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim
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Remedies. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder and at any time
6,
thereafter, the Secured Party may without notice or demand declare immediately due and payable
all amounts secured hereby and shall have the remedies of a Secured Party under the Idaho
Uniform Commercial Code or other applicable law; and without limiting the generality of the
foregoing:
Debtor agrees to put Secured Party in possession of the Collateral on
demand; and

a.

b.
Secured Party is authorized to enter any premises where the Collateral is
situated and take possession of said property without notice or demand and
without legal proceedings; and
c.

At the request of Secured Party, Debtor will assemble the Collateral and

make it available to Secured Party at a place designated by Secured Party which is
reasonably convenient to both parties; and
Debtor agrees that a period of five (5) days from the time notice is sent, by
first class mail or otherwise, nhdf be a reasonable period of notification of a sale
or other disposition of the collateral; and

d.

Debtor agrees that any notice or other communication by Secured Party to
Debtor shall be sent to the mailing address of the Debtor stated herein; and
e.

Debtor agrees to pay on demand the amount of a11 expenses reasonably
f,
.incurredby SwwedPaxty inpratedng or realizing on .theproperty. In the event
that this Security Agreement or any obligation secured by it is referred to an
attorney for protecting or defending the priority of Secured Party's interest or for
collection or realization procedures, Debtor agrees to pay a reasonable attorney
fee, including fees incurred in both trial and appellate courts, or fees incurred
without suit, and expenses of title search and all court costs and costs of public
officials. The sums agreed to be paid in this subparagraph shall be secured
hereby; and

If Sccured Party disposes of the property, Debtor agrees to pay any
g.
deficiency remaining after application of the net proceeds to any indebtedness
secured hereby,
h.
Secured Party shall have the right immediately and without W h e r action
by it, to set off against the obligations of Debtor all money owed by Secured Party
in any capacity to Debtor, whether or not due, and Secured Party shall be deemed
to have exercised such right of setoff and to have made a charge against any such
money immediately upon occurrence of such default even though such charge is
made or entered on the books of Secured Party subsequent thereto.

I

4

-

Security Agreement
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and may not be altered or amended except by a writing signed by the Debtor, accepted by Secured
Party and attached hereto. Any provision found to be invalid shall not invalidate the remainder
hereof. Waivcr of any default shall not constitute a Waiver of any subsequent default. All
Secured Party's rights and remedies, whether evidenced hereby or by any other writing shall be
cumulative and may be exercised singularly or concurrently. Any demand upon or notice to
Debtor that Secured Party may give shall be effective when addressed and mailed to Debtor's
address at which Secured Party customarily communicates with Debtor. This Agreement and all
rights and liabilities hereunder and in and to any and all obligations secured hereby, and in and to
all CollateraI described above, shall inure to the benefit of the Secured Party and its successors
and assigns, and shall be binding upon the Debtor and its successor and assigns. Whenever there
is no outstanding obligation and no commitment on the part of Secured Party under any agreement
which might give rise to an obligation, Debtor may terminate this Agreement upon written notioe
to S e c w d Party. Prior to such termination, this shall be a continuing Agreement in every respect.
This instrument is to be governed by the laws of the State of Idaho. If this instrument is signed by
more than one Debtor, the obligations of Debtor shall be joint and several. All words used herein
shall be construed to be of such gender and number as the circumstances require and a11 references
to Debtor shall include all other persons primarily or secondarily liable hereunder. This
Agreement is intended to t&e effect when signed by Debtor and deliveted to Secured Party. This
agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the
Debtor and shall inure to the benefit of the Seoured Party, its successors and assigns.

I

Signed and Delivered to Secured Party on the day and year first above written.

-

Security Agreement
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EXHIBIT A
Vehicles

1

-

-

-

-

1

Description

-

--

I

VIN #

-

-

066035970

2002

Chevrolet LL Blazer

1GNCSIBWO2K161159

C996015971

1988

Mercury Cougar 2dr,

IMEBM60F94H6705416

A92603587

1982

Chevrolet C 10 Pickup

IGCDC14D2CS143942

T9103079015 iL

1979

Advance Concrete Mixer Trk

lAPTAC4S6X000790

99251150034 WI

1986

Oshkosh Truck 1221 Red

1 OT3R2NA7G1027370

981 1822033-8

1986

Oshkosh Truok 1 102 Red

1 OT3R2HA2G1027292

1985

P 150 4x4 Ford PU redlwhite

0 16001678

1968

Chevrolct Camaro 2dr.YeIlow 124378L304483

B23988 1

1978

Triumph Motorcycle Bon

T14OVXX02778

B1025101

1982

Suzuki Motoroyle GS750EZ

TS1 GR7 1A7C2103942

F076032

1969

Chevrofet ChcvclIe 2dr, Blue
Herd Top - 300 Deluxe

1333792356989

D3005571

1968

Chevrolet El Camino Pk. Yel,

134808215 1188
I

-

737617373

1976

~ficvrolec~hevdlc
2dr. Blok - 1363%158374

M2002037033

1 990

KTM 300 BXC Motorcycle

VBKEXK203LM400592

01133104

1960

Chevrolet Sedan Biscayae 2dr

01 1 1 I01 15665

0 1 6020482

1970

Chcv Chevelle Ma1 4dr Green

136390L189530

5 104361

1970

Chev Chevellc Mal. 4dr Gray

136390L157625

A947085

1939

Chemlet 2dr

Motor #:2 189719
SN;/4JAi215116

--

6909000S01318

I

6

-

1969

Chev Chevclle 2 dr

1363792305384

Security Agreement
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Title #

Description

Year

C 166764

1939

Chevrolet Sedan

2437403

-No Title

1955

Chev Station Wagon

B55K098908

CIS8291

1956

Chev Bcldre 4dr,Oreen/white VC56S 174786

No Title

1956

Chev Belaire HT Green 4dr.

No Information

GI025275

1956

ChcvroIet Tmck

L255K031878

Dl375104

1965

Chevrolet Impala 4dr. White

16469553 14997

No Title

1966

Chevrolet Impala SW W t e

No Information

No Title

1966

Chevrolet C30 Truck Black

No Information

A-5703 15

1967

Chevrolet Impala HT 2drGold

1 13117W-185,341

I395963287

1968

Chevrolet El Camino Black

1368082130317

Dl590391

1968

Chevrolet El Camino Blue

No Title

1968

Chevrolet El Camino Blue

No Information

No Title

1968

Chcvxolet CheveIle4drYellow

No Idonnation

1969

Chev ChevcIIe Coupe 2dr Blu

133279B412898

h

EHS292 WA
-

---

B53792L

--

-

7

4969

.

-_

&eey Che~elleMalibuZdrRcd -l36229K413272

G505358

1969

Chev Chavelle Malibu2drOre

1353792329844

524 1482

1969

Chev Chcvelle Malibu2drBlu

1343792317630

1969
Chev Chevelte MaJibuZdrGre
-

1353792352377

LO03701

I

Vl[N #

H7HA951210135
AZ

1969

Chcvrolet El Camino Blu

136809K312523

B065 174

1971

Chevrolet El Canxino

136801K115872

No Title

1971

Chev. Station Wagon Red

No information

A95605838

1975

Chcv El Camino Red

1C80HSR450652

No Title

1939

Diamond T. Truck

No information

No Title
No Title

1940

Federal Truck

No Information

OIdsmobilc 4dr. Blue

No Information

-

1 1960

-

--

-

-

Security Agreement

Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim
~f Exem~tion

I i !"al(S

hluno3 luO"JaJj

flVL0:8

8002 ' I l ' l d V

Title #

VIN #

Description

Year

No Title

1960

Oldsmobile 4 dr. Green

No Information

F702641

1950

Studcbaker PU 2R5

R-546,304

No Title

1950

Studebaker PU

No Information

Title Application

1990

Honda MB XRIDOR

JH2H30301LK900647

1833 19

1976

Honda Motorcycle XL125

1,115,114

Semi flatbed Trailer

No Information

No Title

-

No Title

1961

Chcvrolet Impala 4 door

No Information
-

No Title

1962

Chevrolet Impala 4 door

No Information

-No Title

1963

Chevrolet Impala 4 door

No Information

No Title

1963

Chevrolet Impala 4 door

No information

No Title

1963

Chevrolet Impala 4 door

No Information

-No Title

1964

Chevrolet Impala 4 door

No Information

No Title

1964

Chevrolct Impala 4 door

No Information

No Title

1960

Ford Pickup

No Information

--

.

-- -

-

- --

-

-

-

Security Aerwmtnt
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EXHIBIT B
Personal Property

All assets of Cary Sargent including but not limited to:

II
I

-

1.

1600 Sq. A. Manufactured home 2 bedroom, 2 bath with attached 2 car garage located at
359 North 2400 East, St, Anthony, Idaho;

2.

30 X 40 foot Shop located at the m e location as the home;

3.

Furnishings and appliances located in the home;

4.

Ruger GPl 00.3574" Revolver;

5.

Cameras and equipment as follows:
a.
Nikon 2000 35mm;
b.
Nikon 2002 35mm;
c.
Nikon 6006 35mm;
d.
Vxrious Lenses 2 4 m , 35-80mm,75-300mm,105mm,300rnrn, and SOOmm;
e,
Nikon SE flash.

-

6.

-

I.

-

Computers and Accessories:
a
Dell Computer;
b.
Dell laptop;
c.
HP Desk printer;
-_.d,.
- Canon copier; and_
e.
SmalI fax machine.
.__

-

.-

7,

Guitars and Accessories:
a.
BIack Fender Telecaster Electric 0uita.r;
b.
Red Fender Stratocaster Electric Guitar;
c.
Fender 2 12 Electric AmpIifier;
d.
Fender 39F Electric Amplifier;

8.

Assorted camping gear including slcophg bags, tent, propane cookstove, lanterns,
miscellmeous utensils, fishing poles and tackle.

9,

Air Compressors and accessories:
a,
Shop Air Compress&,
b.
Craftsman Portable Axlx Compressor;
c.
Small Portable Air Compressor;
d.
Auxiliary Air Tank;
e.
2 Air Wrenches 31%"and I/2'I and sockets;
f.
lngersol Rand Large Air Hammer;

-

I

-

9

-

-

Sseurlty Agroemont
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g,

h.
1.

I

I

Ingersol Rand - Large Air Wrench and Sockets (1 ");
Air Hoses
Air Chisels

10.

Wrenches and Tools:
a.
1 set Large Craftsman Wrench Set (2004);
b.
1 set Large Craftsman Socket Set (2004);
c.
2 Full Rollaway Craftsman Tool Chests with Tools;

11.

3 Paint spray gum and painting accessories:

12.

Body working and metal working tools;

1 3.

Welders and Accessories:
MiIler 250 Dial Arc Stick Welder and leads (2007);
b.
Lincoln Portable Gas Engine Driven Stick Welder (2004);
c.
Lincoln 135T Mig Wire Feed (2007);
d.
1 Cutting Toroh, goggles, and faceshield;
e.
2 WeIding balmets;
a.

II

14.

Debliss Pressure Washer with Honda motor;

15.

Coleman Genset (PIant Scales);
All Miscellaneous Shop tools including:
Craftsmanfloorjacks; b.
Jack Stands;
c.
Lug Wrenches;
d.
Milwaukco Grinder 4";
e,
Milweukec Drill %";
f.
Black and Decker Drill 318";
g.
Bench Orinder;
h.
Log Chains;
i.
High Lift Jack;
j
Parts washer;
k.
SmalI Sandblaster;
1.
2 engine hoists;
m. Bench grinder;
n,
Shelving
o.
Heavy Duty Battery Charger
p.
Bench type drill press

a .

- - .--

--

1

Security Agmmen t
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-

17.

Miscellaneous Shop Supplies:
a.
Engine Oil;
b.
Hydraulic Oil;
c.
Gear Lube;
d.
Parts Cleaning Solvents;
e.
Grease Cartridges;
f,
Filters

18.

All Miscellaneous parts for work trucks,mixer trucks, mixers, and classic cars.

19.

Batch Plant omce trailer

-

End of Exhibit B
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EXHIBIT C
Accounts Receivable
1.

Any money received by Caty Sargent d/b/a Kickin Koncrete as a result of the concrete

business of Cary Sargent.
2,

All accounts receivable of Cary Sargent, d/b/a Kickin Koncrctc as a result of the concrete
business of Cary Sargent.

3.

The proceeds from any accounts receivable owed to Cary Sargent d/b/a Kickin Koncxete.

End of Exhlbit C
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EXHIBIT D
Judgments
Any cause of action against Doyle Beck or the proceeds o f any judgment obtained by Cary

Sargent against Doyle Beck.

End of Exhibit D
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EXHIBIT E
All business assets of Cary Sargent d/b/a Kickin Koncrete including but not limited to:

Business ofice equipment;
Tools;
LeasehoId interests;

1.
2.

3,
4.
5.
6.

Parts;

Equipment for the batching, mixing and delivery of concrete;
Raw materials for batching concrete including but not limited to;
a.
Cement;

b.
c.
d,

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
-- --

18.
19.
20.

Sand;
Gravel;

Aggregate; and
e,
Add-mix chemicals;
Mixer trucks and parts;
1500 gallon water tank; '
Small engine Stand;
Coleman Gcnset
Offioe Trailer
Fuel Tank & Stands;
4 Propane Tanks;
2 Portable Gas Heaters;
Hydraulio Engine Hoist;
Pressure Washer;
3 Air Compressors; _.- ---~ i l l e %O
r Dial Arc Stick Welder and leads (2007);
Lincoln Portable Gas Engine Driven Stick Welder (2004);
Lincoln 135T Mig Wire Peed (2007);

-

-

--

--

-.

--

End of Exhibit E
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D~STRICTSEVEN COURT

county
of Fremont State of Idaho

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 441 1
R. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISR No. 7010
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. 0 . Box 5073 1
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166

Filed:

clpR18am8
E MACE, CLERK

By:
--

-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-02-0484
Plaintiff,

BFUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
CONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION.
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. ("High Valley") files this brief in support of its

motion to challenge the joint efforts of the judgment-debtor, Cary Sargent ("Sargent"), and
his lawyer, William D. Faler, to make Sargent judgment-proof on the eve of trial by
arranging for Sargent to transfer a security interest in everything he owned to Faler's law

firm,Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC ("Faler's Firm"). For the reasons set forth
more fully below, the court should grant High Valley's motion and deny Sargent's claim
of exemption and Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption.
--- ---------- ---,..---.
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Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.
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'

-

11.

BACKGROUND.
On April 2,2008, High Valley caused the Bonneville and Fremont County Sheriffs

offices to levy on Sargent's Amended Judgment in Fremont County Case No. CV-07-0118
("Amended Judgment"). On April 1 1,2008, the Bonneville and Fremont County
Sheriffs offices provided High Valley with a claim of exemption filed by Sargent and a
third-party claim of exemption filed by Faler's Firm.
The Amended Judgment is the only property that High Valley caused the sheriff
to levy upon to date. Thus, the Amended Judgment is the only property at issue in this
motion to contest the claims of exemption.
Sargent claims an exemption in the following money and property:
Wages or salary;
Professional books;
Homestead, house, mobile home, and related structures (manufactured
home);
Jewelry (Watch, rings);
Car, truck or motorcycle (1968 Camaro);
Tools of trade and implements (computer, welder, handtools);
Appliances (household - refrigerator, freezer, microwave, washer and dryer,
etc.);
Furnishings (household - beds, couches, table, chairs, etc.);
Firearms (Marlin 30130);
Musical instruments (electric guitars); and
Other property (tangible personal property consisting of cameras, photo
printer, and scanner).'
Importantly, Sargent claims no exemption in the Amended Judgment that High
Valley levied upon.2

1

See Claim of Exemption dated April 10, 2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion
to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
See Claim of Exemption dated April 10,2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion
to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
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Faler's Firm claims a third-party exemption in the Amended Judgment based on a
security agreement dated January 26,2008, just 27 days before trial in this case, wherein
Sargent purportedly grants Faler's Firm a security interest in "[alny cause of action against
Doyle Beck or the proceeds of any judgment obtained by Cary Sargent against Doyle
~ e c k , "along
~ with what appears to be all of Sargent's remaining property. Faler's Firm's
third-party claim of exemption recites that the security agreement is to secure payment of
$190,874.58 for legal fees and costs Faler's Firm provided to sargent4
THE COURT SHOULD DENY SARGENT'S CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
BECAUSE SARGENT CLAIMS NO EXEMPTION FOR THE AMENDED
JUDGMENT.

111.

Idaho Code Section 1 1-201 provides that all property of a judgment debtor "not
exempt by law" is subject to execution. Section 11-203 sets forth the procedures for a
judgment debtor to claim "that property levied upon is exempt." Specifically, the judgment
debtor must complete and file a claim of exemption form identifyrng the exemption the
judgment debtor claims for the property that was levied upon. I.C. 5 11-203; see also I.C. 5
8-507C. The judgment debtor must deliver the completed claim of exemption form to the
sheriff "within fourteen (14) days" after the sheriff levies on the judgment debtor's property.
I.C.

5

11-203(a). The judgment debtor must file the form with the sheriff within the 14-day

period or "[tlhe sheriff shall refuse to accept or honor a claim not filed with him within that
period . . ." I.C. 5 11-203(c). "Until a levy, property is not affected by the execution." I.C.

'

See Exhibit "D" to the Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,
2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and ThirdParty Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
See the Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,2008, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of
Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
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Here, the sheriff levied on Sargent's Amended Judgment on April 2,2008. The
sheriff has not yet levied on any of Sargent's other property. Sargent delivered his claim of
exemption to the sheriff on April 10 or 11,2008. The claim of exemption does not identify
any exemption applicable to the Amended Judgment or any reason that the Amended
Judgment is "exempt by law" from execution.' I.C. 5 1 1-201. As such, Sargent has failed
to identify any reason the Amended Judgment is exempt from execution. Because Sargent
has failed to show the Amended Judgment Sargent is "exempt by law" from execution, the
court should grant High Valley's motion.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD DENY FALER'S FIRM'S THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION BECAUSE FALER7SFIRM'S SECURITY INTEREST IN
SARGENT7SAMENDED JUDGMENT IS AN UNLAWFUL TRANSFER AS TO
HIGH VALLEY.
Under its express terms, Idaho's LJniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, I.C. $5 55-910

thru 55-920, "shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among states enacting it." I.C. 5 55920. Among the other states enacting the UFTA, courts explain that "[blecause the
Fraudulent Transfer Act is remedial in naturc, it should be liberally construed." Nat 'I Loan
Investors, L. P. v. Givens, 952 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Utah 1998). "The purpose of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act is primarily for the benefit of creditors, not grantees. It is a
remedial statute and a liberal construction should be given it to accomplish its purpose of
giving speedy relief against a fraudulent debtor." Running v. Widdes, 190 N.W.2d 169,
172 (Wis. 1971); see also Mullens v. Frazer, 59 S.E.2d 694 (W.Va. 1950) (act is to be
liberally interpreted for suppression of fraud); Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 282 N.W. 661

5

See Claim of Exemption dated April 10, 2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion
to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
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(Minn. 1938). Thus, for Idaho to make the UFTA "uniform . . . among the states
enacting it', as expressly required by Section 55-920, this court should liberally construe
the UFTA to provide "speedy relief against a fraudulent debtor." Running, supra.
Section 55-914(2) of the UFTA provides, "A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to
an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." One Idaho appellate court
summarized the unlawfbl transfer analysis of Section 55-914(2) as follows:
The inquiry whether a transfer of assets is fraudulent under section
55-914(2) is satisfied by affirmative answers to the following elements: (1)
Did the creditor's claim arise before the transfer was made? (2) Was the
transfer made to an insider? (3) Was the transfer made for an antecedent
debt? and (4) Was the debtor insolvent at the time the transfer was made and
did the insider have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent?
Alcan Building Products, a Division ofAIcun Aluminum Corporation v. Peoples, 124 Idaho
338, 340-341 (Ct.App. 1993). How each of the four requirements of Section 55-914(2) is
satisfied is discussed below.
A.

High Valley's Claim Against Sargent Arose Before Sargent Transferred The
Security Interest In The Amended Judgment To Faler's Firm.

The security agreement whereby Sargent transferred a security interest in the
Amended Judgment to Faler's Firm is dated January 26,2008.~High Valley's claims
against Sargent arose in February 2002,' nearly six years before Sargent transferred the
security interest to Faler's Firm. Thus, High Valley's claim against Sargent arose long

See Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10, 2008, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of
Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
7
See High Valley's Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint, already on file
with the court.
-------'EST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD-
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before Sargent decided to transfer the security interest in thc Amended Judgment to Faler's
Firm. Sargent had been well-aware of High Valley's claim for years before he, with the aid
of his lawyer, attempted to make himselfjudgment-proof on the eve of trial.

B.

Sargent's Transfer Was Made To Faler's Firm As An Insider.

Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") contains various definitions of
the term "insider," all of which focus on the close relationship between the transferee and
the judgment debtor. The definition includes "a managing agent of the debtor." I.C. 5 55910(7)(d). The UFTA does not define the term "managing agent." However, liberally
construing the statutory definition of insider under the UFTA as this court must, and
drawing from the treatment of "insiders" under the bankruptcy law upon which the UFTA is
based, Faler is clearly Sargent7s"managing agent" and therefore an insider.
Black's Law Dictionary explains, "In the most general sense this term [attorney]
denotes an agent or substitute, or one who is appointed and authorized to act in the place or
stead of another." BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
128 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "managing agent" as "[a] person who is invested with general power, involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, as distinguished from an ordinary agent or employee,
who acts in an inferior capacity, and under the direction and control of superior authority,
both in regard to the extent of the work and Ihe manner of executing the same." BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
64 (6th ed. 1990).
Many sections of the UFTA, including the definition of "insider," are patterned after
the bankruptcy code. In fact, the UFTA definition of "insider" is nearly identical to the
bankruptcy code's definition. Compare I.C. 5 55-91O(7) and 1 1 U.S.C. 5 101(31); see also
Fidelity Bond & Mort. Co. v. Brand, 371 B.R. 708,719 (E.D.Pa. 2007) (citing Michael L.
- - --- -- - --.
-- - -

-

-

- -

-

-
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Cook and Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Tran.der Act: An Introductory
Critique, 62 Am. Bankr.L.J. 87, 87 (1 988) ("When drafting the model Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, the authors [of the UFTA] looked to the federal Bankruptcy Code for
guidance. . . . many provisions in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act were modeled on
the Bankruptcy Code")).
The legislative history on the "insider" definition states, "An insider is one who has
a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer
scrutiny than those dealing at arms length with the debtor." In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R.
925,934 (N.D.Ga. 1992) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1977);
S.Rep. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Adrnin.News 1978 pp.
5787, 58 10,6267). One court explained, "[Tlhe 'insider7definition must be flexibly applied
'to include a broad range of parties who have a close relationship with the Debtor." In re
Main, Inc., 21 3 B.R. 67,81 (E.D.Pa. 1997). Another court pointed out that courts have
"uniformly held" that the statutory definition of insider "is merely illustrative" and "must be
flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis." Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R.
438,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). "The court must closely examine the claimant's relationship to
the debtor to determine whether the claimant has used an opportunity to adjust its position in
such a way that other creditors are prejudiced." In re Beverages Int 'I, Ltd., 50 B.R. 273,281
(Mass. 1985). Few relationships are closer than the fiduciary relationship between attorneys
and clients. "The relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, binding an attorney to
the utmost good faith in fair dealing with his client, and obligating the attorney to discharge
that trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and fidelity." Blough v. Wellman,
132 Idaho 424,426 (1 999).
?ST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD-
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Under either the statutory definition of "managing agent of the debtor," or the more
liberal analysis focusing on the closeness of the relationship between the transferee and the
debtor, Faler's Firm is clearly an insider under the UFTA. Faler served as Sargent's
attorney throughout the past six years of this litigation. Faler is not merely an agent "who
acts in an inferior capacity," but is a managing agent "invested with general power,
involving the exercise ofjudgment and discretion," to defend Sargent against High Valley's
claims and to prosecute Sargent's claim against Doyle Beck. Faler has managed Sargent's
claims and now manages the very Amended Judgment High Valley has levied upon.
Faler has a "sufficiently close relationship" with Sargent that his conduct is subject
to much closer scrutiny than others dealing with Sargent at arms length. Faler has extended
Sargent credit for more than $190,000 in legal fees and costs.8 Then, on the eve of trial,
undoubtedly realizing that High Valley could receive a sizeablejudgment against his client,
Faler took advantage of his insider information and arranged for his firm to receive a
security interest in the Amended Judgment and thereby "adjust[ed] its position in such a
way that other creditors [like High Valley] are prejudiced." Beverages, supra. Faler acted
on this insider knowledge to secure his own debt and leave Sargent judgment proof.
Sargent7stransfer of a security interest in what appears to be all of his property to
Faler's Firm is not an arms-length transaction because Faler is not just any "ordinary
creditor." Faler owes Sargent a fiduciary duty of utmost loyalty and good faith, a duty that
binds him "with the strictest accountability and fidelity to his client's interests." Matter of

Lutz, 100 Idaho 45'49 (1 979) (emphasis added). Out of all the creditors Sargent chose to

See the Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,2008, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of
Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
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prefer at the time he is insolvent and High Valley's claim is pending, he chooses Faler, the
one person that is duty-bound to place Sargent's interests ahead of his own.
As a result of the security agreement, Sargent and Faler both have an interest in
Sargent's property. To the extent there is a conflict between Faler's interest and Sargent's
interest, Faler must put Sargent's interests ahead of his own. However, Faler and Sargent
both benefit from the security agreement to the prejudice of other creditors. Faler uses his
inside information to place his interests ahead of other creditors. Sargent makes himself
judgment-proof by granting a security interest to the one creditor that must place Sargent's
interests ahead of his own. In the meantime, Sargent continues to live in his house, drive his
cars, and operate his business while relying on the security interest to his attorney-agent
Faler to block the collection efforts of creditors like High Valley. This is exactly the type of
fraudulent arrangement between a debtor and an "insider" that Idaho Code Section 559 14(2) is designed to remedy

C.

Sargent's Transfer Of The Security Interest Was Made For An Antecedent
Debt To Faler's Firm.

Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption specifically recites that the security
agreement "was made to secure payment for legal fees and costs incurred as a result of legal
representation provided by [Faler's Firm] to [Sargent]" in the amount of $1 90,874.58 "as
submitted in Sargent's Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit for Fees in [sic] Costs in both

matter^."^

Thus, Sargent's transfer of the security interest in the Amended Judgment was

based on an antecedent debt to Faler's Firm.

see Third-Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. dated April 10,2008, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of
Exemption filed concurrently herewith.
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D.

Sargent Was Insolvent At The Time The Transfer Was Made And Faler's
Firm Had Reasonable Cause To Believe That Sargent Was Insolvent.

Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that "[a] debtor who is generally
not paying his . . . debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent." I.C. tj 55-91 l(2).
Here, the record provides clear examples that Sargent was "generally not paying his
debts" as they became due at the time he transferred the security interest to Faler's Firm.
First, Sargent was obviously not paying his debts to Faler's Firm as they became due
because the third-party claim of exemption recites that Sargent owes Faler's Firm
$190,874.58. Sargent owed a significant portion of this debt as of January 26,2008, when
he transferred the security interest to Faler's Firm. Sargent had made no payment to Faler's
Firm in six years.'0 Second, Sargent has not been paying on the $41'8 16.77 debt he has
owed to Glendale Construction, Inc. since April 2004." Sargent was not generally paying
his debt to Glendale in June 2006 when High Valley deposed Kim Allen about the debt.'*
Sargent was not generally paying this debt at the time of trial because Sargent admitted that
he still owed Glendale for the debt. Additionally, Sargent has not paid anyhng to High
Valley on hls $123,326.30 debt from the judgment entered in this case. Finally, Sargent has
not been paying his taxes current having paid his 200 1 federal taxes on or about December
12,2007--one month before Sargent signed the security agreement.13
Equally clear is the fact that Faler's Firm had reasonable cause to believe that
Sargent was insolvent at the time he gave the security interest to Faler's Firm. As Sargent's
10

See billing statements attached as exhibits to Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for
Attorney Fees and Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter
of High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, dated February 2 1 , 2008, already on file with the court.
1I
See High Valley Trial Exhibit #28 and the trial testimony of Cary Sargent and Kim Allen.
l 2 See Kim Allen Depo., pp. 126-132 attached to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated April 18,2008 as
Exhibit "A."
3ST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD-

3rief in Support of Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and
Third-Party Claim of Exemption
Dane 778

On.Contest.ExemDtion.doc

attorney, Faler knew that Sargent was not generally paying his debts to Faler's Firm as they
came do. Faler also had actual knowledge that Sargent was not paying his debts to Glendale
because Faler attended Kim Allen's deposition in June 2006 where she testified that Sargent
had not paid anything on his debt to Glendale. However, the best evidence that Faler had
reasonable cause to believe that Faler was insolvent is the existence of the very security
agreement that Faler's Firm relies on for its third-party claim of exemption. The fact that
Faler's Firm received a security interest in not just one or two items of Sargent's property,
but in arguably all of Sargent's present and hture assets, undisputedly shows that Faler had
reasonable cause to believe that Sargent was insolvent. If Faler did not believe Sargent was
insolvent, he would not have required the security agreement in the first place (unless Faler
merely wanted to make his client judgment proof).

E.

The Court Has Broad Power To Deny Faler's Firm's Third-Party Claim Of
Exemption In The Amended Judgment.

Under the UFTA, the remedies available to a creditor-victim of a fraudulent transfer
are extremely broad. For example, a creditor may obtain "[alvoidance of the transfer or
obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim" or "any other relief the
circumstances may require." I.C. tj 55-916. "Avoidance of the transfer" or "[alny other
relief' necessarily includes denial of a third-party claim of exemption. Thus, this court has
the power and authority to deny Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption and pennit
High Valley to proceed with execution on the Amended Judgment.

l 3 See Cary Sargent's 2001 federal income tax return attached to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated
April 18,2008 as Exhibit "B."
,',nx,7,7 1m, c.r,n..--m
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V.

CONCLUSION.
Base on the foregoing, the court should grant High Valley's motion and deny the

claim of exemption and the third-party claim of exemption.
DATED this

/y Qof

April72008.
McGRATH, SMITH &

BY:

.

Bryan D. Smit

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of April, 2008,I caused a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTEST
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF EXEMPTION to be
served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery,
addressed to the following:
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
rnight Delivery

William D. Faler, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130

[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

Bryan D. S
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 441 1
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010
McGRATH, SMITH ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. 0 . Box 50731
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166

---DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho
F~led:

-

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.,
And Defendant, Doyle Beck

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho limited liability company,

)
)

Case No. CV-02-484

Plaintiff,
)

1

VS.
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRYAN D. SMITH

)
)
)
)

1

> ss
1

I, Bryan D. Smith, state and declare the following under oath:

1.

1 am over the age of 21, 1 represent the plaintiff, and 1 make this affidavit

based on my personal knowledge.

2.

Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" are true and correct copies of

the cover page and pages 126-132 of the transcript of the deposition of Kim Allen taken
June 14, 2006 showing that as of that date Cary Sargent had paid nothing on his
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$41,8 16.77 debt he has owed to Glendale Construction since at least February 2004. See
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #28.

3.

Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of

Cary Sargent's 2001 federal income tax 1040 form dated December 12, 2007 showing
that Cary Sargent owed $1,302 federal income tax for 2001.
Further your affiant $ a y ~ t hnaught.
DATED this

/e

A p r i l , 2008.

s
Bryan D. Smi
Attorneys for fiaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before rnf this /@day

of jlpril, 2008.

~ e s i d i at
n ~Idaho ~all; Idaho
My Commission Expires: 0411 1111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /6fi-of
April, 2008 1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH to be served by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to
the following:
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission

[ ] Courthouse Mail Box
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William D. Faler, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

EXHIBIT "A"
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., An

)

Idaho Limited Liability Company,

1

Plaintiff,

1

vs.

)

Case No. CV-02-1279

1

CARY SARGENT,
Defendant.

)

DEPOSITION OF KIM ALLEN
JUNE 14, 2006

REPORTED BY:

DIANA KILPATRICK, CSR No. 727, RPR
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1 with duties that belong to Joan Sluder?
2
A. Yes.

Yes.
Q. And what is your official title?
A. Bookkeeper.
Q. And what bookkeeping experience did you
have before going to work for Glendale that
qualified you for the job?
A. I have worked in lumber yards doing the
same; invoices, accounts receivable, accounts
payable, for many years before that, since I was
a sophomore in high school.
Q. What year did you graduate from high
school?
A. 1992.
Q. So how many years' experience have you
had with accounts receivable, accounts payable,
invoicing and that kind of work?
A. Probably about 14.
Q. And the last six of those years have
been at Glendale?
A. Yes, they have.
Q. Who has been primarily responsible for
doing all the bookkeeping at Glendale for the
last six years?
A. Myself.
Q. Anybody else help you?
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P a g e 13

P a g e 11

1

A. Joan Sluder.
Q. What does she do there?
A. She's the secretary of the company.
4 She signs all of the payroll checks, any kind of
5 checks I need signed. Any legal things she

5

7
8

6
7
8

2
3

Q. What kind of legal he things?
A. Or banking statements, anything like
9 that. She does all of that. Then she just
10 assists getting the money, the deposits. When I
11 get money in we discuss where it needs to go,
1 2 that sort of thing.
13
Q. Please, if you could, give me a brief
1 4 description of your job duties.
15
A. Okay. I take care of -- well, sand and
1 6 gravel, we weigh the trucks in and out. I do all
1 7 the invoices for loads that go in and out; I
1 8 price all of the invoices and do the monthly
1 9 billing on the accounts receivable side; I
2 0 receive all the payables and enter them into the
2 1 computer also; I do all the banking deposits and
2 2 bank reconciliations, and I do payroll. Then
2 3 just regular office duties of the phone and
2 4 filing and pretty much all of it in there.
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Q. Which ones overlap?
A. Taking care of the accounts payable.
She -- anything that I pay -- you know, I receive
all of the invoices, but anything that I pay, I
converse with her first and she tells me which
ones that she wants me to write the checks out
for. And then I do that, we go over them and she
signs all the checks.
Q. And how does she determine which ones
she wants to write checks out for and which ones
she doesn't?
A. I don't know how she determines. I
present to her what we have, what needs to be
paid, and we walk over them, which ones need to
be paid most importantly and we take care of
those first.
Q. Has anyone trained you to do your work
in the Glendale way, so to speak?
A. No.
Q. Have you then used your training and
experience before getting to Glendale to carry
forward in the way you do accounts payable,
accounts receivable, etcetera?

3
4

f

1

A. Yes.
(Exhibit No. 1 Marked.)
BY MR. SMITH:
Q. I'm going to hand you what's been
marked as Exhibit 1, Kim. This is a copy of the
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tec
Did you got a copy of this before today?
A. Yes, I did.

4 (Pages 10 to 13)
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Q. Are these numbers rolled into that
1
2 Exhibit 10 somehow?

Q. Did you prepare this one, too?
A. Yes.
Q. It looks like this is just for payroll.
Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. The total amount due was $38,662.29?
A. Correct.
Q. Did Cary ever pay that?
A. No.
Q. And without being repetitive, is there
any computer invoice to reflect the amounts
contained on that last payroll statement?
A. No.
Q. And this was also done outside of the
ordinary business practice of maintaining
accounts receivables on the computer?
A. Yes.
Q. He never paid any of it?
A. No.
Q. Do you know how much Cary Sargent owes
Glendale Construction?
A. What I have is this amount.
Q. $38,662.29?
A. Correct.
Q. At a minimum?
--.--

Q. They are?
A. Yes.
(Exhibit No. 12 Marked.)
8 BY MR. SMITH:
Q. Please take a look at Exhibit 12.
9
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. This appears to be an additional
1 2 typewritten statement that you sent to Cary about
13 February 23rd of '04.
14
A. Correct.
Q. Now, it shows amounts for County,
15
1 6 Property Tax and Insurance on the Cement Trucks?
A. Yes. And I did forget about, when you
17
18 asked on that one, we did -- this was the
1 9 property tax that we were paying for the plant to
2 0 be there.
Q. Okay. So it looks like Doug did have
21
2 2 you invoice him for the property tax for the
2 3 batch plant and also the insurance -24
A. On the truck. That's correct.
Q. Does that refresh your recollection as
25
---"..~--
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A. Yes.
Q. Are there other things that he owes for
that you know of??
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Have you heard about them?
A. No.
Q. We're down to the last stack, kind of.
(Exhibit No. 11 Marked.)
BY MR. SMITH:
Q. Here's Exhibit 11.
A. Okay.
Q. It's dated October 17th, 2002. What is
this?
A. This is a check. I had not normally
listed it out as seen in the previous exhibits
where I broke it down for him. I pulled a copy
off of my computer and sent it to him that way,
broken down rather than breaking it down on an
actual letterhead.
Q. So this is, again, a statement?
A. Correct.
Q. And showing what, an account
receivable?
A. This is just showing those two weeks,
2 5 what we paid to him.
~ f f i d a v i t a r ~ aD.nSmith
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A. I believe so. Let me look. Yes, they

3
4 are.

5
6
7

1 to whether or not Cary was using some trucks

2 owned by Glendale?
A. I don't know if they were Glendale's
3
4 trucks or if they were on our insurance. I was
5 just told that these trucks were on our
6 insurance. I have insurance cards for them, and
7 Doug told me to bill them out.
Q. Have you ever seen any invoices,
8
9 written or computerized, relating to any trucks?
10
A. No.
11
Q. Then it looks like the balance at the
12 end of November of '04, plus the amounts
13 contained in this statement of February 23rd of
1 4 '04, total $41,816.77.
A. Correct.
15
Q. Then there's this statement that says,
16
17 "If at all possible, could you please send us
1 8 some kind of payment on this account?"
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Why did you include that in there if
2 1 Doug was just working it out?
A. Because we were trying -- he told me he
22
2 3 was working it out, and I asked if there would be
2 4 a payment sent, and he said that I could ask him
2 5 if there was any way he could send a payment.
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Page 132

Page 130

1
A. No.
2
Q. So as the bookkeeper for Glendale
3 Construction, as you sit here today, is it your
4 understanding that the balance owed by Cary is
5 the $4 1,816.77?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Are you aware of any other sums that
8 Cary owes Glendale Construction?
9
A. The only other ones would be the
1 0 property tax for 200412005, and 200512006.
11
Q. Did you ever invoice him for those?
12
A. No.
Q. And those would be less than a couple
13
1 4 hundred bucks?
15
A. Correct.
16
Q. Let's just take a break for a second.
1 7 I believe I may have just a couple more
1 8 questions. I think I'm done. Then I'll give you
1 9 the homework assignments.
20
A. Okay.
21
(A Break Was Taken.)
22 BY MR.SMITH:
23
Q. How long has Glendale Construction been
2 4 using QuickBooks?
25
A. I do not -- ever since I've been there.

Q. And then on April 20th you sent him a
2 letter, and restating that he owed $41,8 16.77?
3
A. Correct.
4
Q. And then you again tell him, "It would
5 be greatly appreciated if you could send some
6 money."
7
A. Yes.
8
Q. Did Doug tell you to do that?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Was Doug upset that Cary wasn't paying
11 him?
12
A. No.
13
Q. And then you say, "We understand that
1 4 times are tough and that you are just getting
1 5 started again." What does that mean?
16
A. That through the winter months, that he
1 7 wasn't running through the winter months. We
1 8 also were slow, and that is why we were asking
1 9 for some. We know from experience it's tough to
2 0 get started back in the spring.
Q. Okay. What about '05 and '06? Did you
21
2 2 ever bill him for those amounts that are owed?
23
A. No.
Q. Did you ever send him statements or
24
2
5
billings
saying, "Hey, what about the $4 1,OOO?ll
-1
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1
Q. And how far back do the data files go?
A. No.
2
A. I'm not positive exactly. Invoices for
Q. Was that written off!
3 customers, I can go back -- I've had to look back
A. No.
4 to, like, '98, and I can pull up that
Q. What's happening with that account
5 information. Anything banking wise, it doesn't
receivable?
6 let me in.
A. Nothing that I know of.
Q. All right. Let's just go over your
Q. Why aren't you billing him?
I 7
8 homework assignment. Do you have a pen?
A. Since Doug's passing, we have not done
9
any of them. It's come up in conversation with
A. I don't. Thank you.
Q. You were going to look up the invoices
Joan that we need to contact Cary and we need to 1 0
11 for the cement deliveries on the first page of
get something worked out, but we have not done
so.
Q. Does Joan understand that the only
Q. Then you were going to look up when the
amount that's owed is that $41,000?
A. She knows that's the balance on there.
Yes. After that, she knows we've done the
Q. And you were going to look up to see if
property tax, but that would be it.
17
1 8 the $970 check ever got deposited.
Q. Are you aware of any payments by Cary
19
A. Okay.
to Glendale Construction for use of the trucks,
20
Q. Then there was a $20,000 check dated
any kind of trucks, owned by Glendale
2 1 January 7th, 1999. You were going to see if you
Construction?
22 could find what the invoice was for that, and
A. I'm not aware of any.
2 3 whether it was deposited. Then there were those
Q. Are you aware of any payments by Cary
2 4 three checks: One for 3,000 to Kirk; 1,000, I
to Glendale Construction for a batch plant,
25 think it's going to be to Cary; one to, I think
either a purchase or a lease or anythmg?
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Form

Department of the Treasury -- Internal Revenue Service
1040 U.S. Individual income Tax Return

Use
the
IRS
label.
Otherwise,
please

2001

(99)

IRS use only -- DO n o t m i t e o r staplein this space.

,2001. ending

For the year Jan. 1-Dec. 31.2001, or othertax year beginning

k

Spouse's social security no.

CARY SARGENT
PO BOX 3 2 1
a i n t Anthony

o r t v ~ e . ~S

Presldential
ElecUon a m p a l g n

Filing Status
Check only
one box.

1
1
2
3

4

5

A

Note. Checking "Yes" will not change your tax or reduce your refund.
DOyou, or your spouse if filing a joint return, want $3 to go to thii fund?
Single
-Marriedfiling joint return (even if only one had income)

...............

You
Yes

n

No

X

Married filing separate return. Enter spouse's S S N above h full name hers.

No

bDARLA SARGENT

-enter child's name here. b

Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child (yr. spouse died*

). (See instructions.)

Alimnyreceived . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Business income or (loss). Attach Schedule C or C-EZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule O if required. If not required. check here C . . . .

ScheduleF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.....................
Student loan interest deduction (see instructions) . . . . . . . .
Archer MSA deduction. Altach Form 8853. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moving expenses. Attach Form 3903. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Om-half of self-employment tax. Attach Schedule SE . . . .
Self-employed health insurance deduction (see instructions) .
Self-employed SEP, SIMPLE, and qualified plans. . . . . . . .
Penalty on early withdrawal of savings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
nrrnony paid

b

Recipient's SSN

b

NTF 2554184
Copvrioht 2001
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Spouse
Yes

n n

Head of household (with qualifying person). (See instructions.) If the qualifying person is a child but not your dependent,

b Taxable amount (see inst.) . .

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
3 la

A

-

da and 6 b

11
12
13

1 104012

must enter
your SSN(S) above.

YOU

ID 8 3 4 4 5

Exemptions

Gross
Income

1 OMS NO. 1545-0074

.20

Your soclal securlty number

!eInstructions.

CAA

Page 2

SARGENT

Form 1040 (2001)

34 Amount from llne 33 (adjusted gross income) ......................................
358 Check if:
You were 65,oider.
Blind;
Spouse was 65 or older.
Blind.
Add the number of boxes checked above and enter the total here ............. 35a
Standard
Deduction
b If you are married filing separately and your spouse Iternlzes deductlons, or you
for
were a dual-status alien, see instructions and check here. ................... 35b
People who
ltemked deductions (from Schedule A) or your standard deduction (see left margin) ....... .36
36
checked
any
On '37
Subtract line 36 from line 34. .................................................... ......>...
37
line 35a or
p''!
&z2;s$.
35b or who
38 Ifline 34 is $99,725 or less, multiply $2,900 by the total number of exemptions claimed on
can be
line 6d. If line 34 is over $99,725, see the worksheet in the instructions. ................... 38
claimed as
Taxable
Income. Subtract line 38 from line 37. If line 38 is more than line 37, enter -0-. ...... 39
39
see ~nst.
b Form 4972. . . . . . . . . . 40
Form(s) 8814
Tax
(see
inst). Check if any tax is from a
40
IUl others:
41
.........................
Alternative
mlnlmum
tax
(see
instructions).
Attach
Form
6251.
41
Sin le
42
$4,%d
42 Add lines 40 and 41. .........................................................
Head of
43 Foreign tax credit. Attach Form 1116 it requlred. ............ 43
household,
44 Credit for child & dependent care expenses. Attach Form 2441 44
$6,650
45 Credit for the elderly or the disabled. Attach Schedule R ...... 45
Married
46 Education credits. Attach Fonn 8863 ..................... 46
47 Rate reduction credit. See the worksheet in the instructions ... 47
Child tax credit (see Instructions). ....................... 48
48
$7,600
49 Adoption credit. Attach Form 8839. ...................... ........
Manjed
49
filing
50 Other credits from:
Form 3801)
b [l~ o r m
8396 $
.> :.$
$
..&........
C
Form8801
$3.800
.
, 50
51 Add lines 43 through 50. These are your total credits.. ............................... 51
52
52 Subtract line 51 from line 42. If line 51 is more than line 42, enter 4-....................
Other
53 Self-employment tax. Attach Schedule SE. ......................................... 53
Taxes
54 Social security and Medicare tax on tip income not reported to employer. Attach Form 4137 ... 54
55 Tax on qualifmd plans, including IRAs, & other tax-favored accts. Attach Form 5329 if required 55
56 Advance earned income credit payments from Form(s) W-2. ........................... 56
57 Household employment taxes. Anach Schedule H. ................................... 57
Tax and
Credits

0

0

0

59,857

0

--

7,109

v

0

58 Add lines 52 through 57. This is your total tax. .....................................
7 I 8 88
59 Federal income tax withheld from Forms W-2 and 1099 . . . . . . 59
2001 estimated tax payments & amt. applied from 2000 return . 60
Earned Income credit (EIC) ........................... 61a
.:>..:.+:.:+:.:.:.:.:.;
:.
<;.$
:.:<<.:.:<.:g.::
Nontaxable earned income . 161b (
.:.:.:.:.>> ......
Excess social security and RRTA tax withheld (see instructions) 62
1 104012
63 Additional child tax credit. Attach Form 8812. .............. 63
NTF2554185
64 Amount paid with request for extension to file (see instructions) 64
Copyright 2001
b~ Form4136
~
~
~ 65 ~ Other
~ payments.
l
~Check~if fromd a
, Form 2439
~
~
~ 65 ~
LP-Forms
Add
lines
59,
60,
61
a,
and
62
through
65.
These
are
your
total
payments
................
66
software Only
If
line
66
is
more
than
line
58, subtract line 58 from line 66. This Is the amount you overpaid. ..
67
~~fu,.,d
688 Amount of line 67 you want refunded to you ......................................
Direct
b Routing no.
deposit?
See
b d Account no.

0

Amount
YOUOwe

11,600
36,133
7,109

0

0

and fill in 68b,
6 8 ~and
.
68d.

12,124
47,733

0

.

.

29

58
..>.+:.
x$i
<
>
;
F
.
:
'
: :':FgI,
w,:s.:.:.<
......
.?..%.,.-.:.,..,......
*..,
., ........
r>3*?i'?i

9,190

'A'.

*.:g!s$
;.:.:.:

...........

-.-........
q*::<.:..<.,

. .:.$',$;
:gs$j$
:...........
z:::;*x
..:.., >>,
<s:>$:k.

.q&@
..,........
....
::$%:?<%
..........
$-:
'......
:;?$$$$$$$$

.

69 Amt. of line 67 you want applle
70 Amount you owe. Subtract li
71 Estimatedtax penalty. Also in

350
6,759
2,402

55

r....).

7,888

66
67
68a

0

.

U

Third Party Do you want lo allow another person to discus this return with the IRS (see instructions)?. . . Yes. Complete the following.
Phone
Persona Jfptification
Designee ,O.";gnee"'
no.
number
) .............

Sign
Here

W No

1

Underpenalties of perjury I declare that l have examined this return mdaccompanyingschedulesandstatements and to the best of my knowledgeand belief.
they are true, correct, and'complete. Declaration of preparer(other than taxpayer)is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.

Joint return?
See instructions.
Keep a copy
for your
records.

Your signature

Daytime phone number

Your occupation

Date

.., ....:...:......
.:.:;;::,..>
r ................. .,., .
,,.:<<..:.:.;?5*>*.:&Tg<g
cs&s$$&.>
~
~
j
$
~

.A
....,

spouse's signature. ~fa joint return.

Spouse's occupation

both must sign. Date
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g

$

$

:zsKE
. ; .+i,h?
x . ~ ,.yT
:y+
~:.:
~.:~.::
~$~...:<
~x::,.:?~ : ..~..<.~>:,:..:,:~
, :~.:~.:

~

............Y< ................. <
.....
........... ~p>:-:.>.:.;~:x:$~~.:.:~:<

Date

Paid
signature
Prepare?
Pre~arer's

~

lo

Check if

n

Preparer's SSN or PTlN

PO 0 - 00 - 2 690
/L/~
>.aP self-employed
MAN SUTTON ~ ( s I ~ ~ M PA
O ~ SE1~20-0561324
;PLAZA
L0
08-356-3452
Preparers Edition

Form

1040 (2001)

District Seven Court
County of Fremont
Sta@ of Idaho
Date:. ' d !2 ' 9 1 0 5
Time: 57 ? A /Y)

William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0 . Box 501 30
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18

C

Deputy
Clerk:
Abbie
-M

Attorneys for Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-02-00484

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM D.
FALER
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney of record on behalf of Cary Sargent in the above-entitled matter
and I make the statements herein based upon my own personal knowledge unless
otherwise stated.

2.

I was the attorney for Cary Sargent in obtaining a Judgment against Doyle Beck
wherein Cary Sargent recovered an amount of $28,896.88 on February 7,2008,
and for which attorney fees and costs were granted in the amount of $53,323.25
on March 3 1,2008, making the total judgment due of $82,220.13.

3.

I am not related in any way to Cary Sargent.

4.

Neither I nor any member of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., have any
right whatsoever to manage Cary Sargent's business (Gckin Koncrete) or any part
of his personal life.

jffidavit of William D. Faler
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5.

I have never been involved in business decisions or operations in any manner
whatsoever involving Cary Sargant and/or Kickin Koncrete.

6.

The sole relationship between myself, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
on the one part, and Cary Sargent on the other, is that Holden, Kidwell, Hahn &
Crapo, P.L.L.C and myself, were hired by Cary Sargent and ultimately directed by
him to defend a lawsuit brought against him by High Valley Concrete, Inc., and to
prosecute a claim against Doyle Beck on Cary Sargent's behalf.

7.

The agreement between Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. and Cary
Sargent regarding payment for the incurred attorney fees and costs was that no
payment was due in either the defense of the High Valley Concrete, Inc., lawsuit
or the prosecution of the claim against Doyle Beck until after the conclusion of
those matters.

8.

Two separate billings were prepared in January and March 2004, but neither was
presented to Cary Sargent for payment until after the conclusion of the pending
litigation in February 2008. Thus, there was no outstanding debt to Holden,
Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. at the time of the Security Agreement.

9.

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. received a payment from Cary
Sargent in April 2008, in response to the presentation of the billings for fees and
costs.

10.

Payment arrangements are still pending as to how much will be expected to be
paid monthly.

Dated t h i s a ? a y of April, 2008.

State of Idaho

1
:ss

County of Bonneville )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

34- day of April, 2008.

Residing at: Z m
Commission Expires:
Affidavit of William D. Faier
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 7 9 % a y of April, 2008.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

Affidavit of William D. Faler

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[ ]U.S.Mail
[ >] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other

William D. Ibkf .
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
G \WPDATA\WDF\-Client Files R-SBargent 1082nWord Processing\DefenseWost Judgment Collections\M~davit- WDF.wpd
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District Seven Court
county of Fremont

William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
mail in^ Address:
P. 0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-951 8

Date:
Time:
Deputy Clerk:

Attorneys for Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-02-00484

VS.

AFFIDAVIT OF CARY SARGENT

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

Cary Sargent, first being duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am a party in the above entitled-action and I make the statements herein based
upon my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated.

2.

I am the judgment creditor in an action against Doyle Beck wherein I recovered a
Judgment in the amount of $28,896.88 on February 7,2008, and for which
attorney fees and costs were granted in the amount of $53,323.25 on March 3 1,
2008, making the total judgment due of $82,220.13.

3.

My business, Kickin Koncrete, is a sole proprietorship under which 1; as an
individual, do business under the assumed business name of Kickin Koncrete.

4.

I have no employees in my business other than myself.

Affidavit of Carey Sargent
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I have no agent of any type that has any authority whatsoever to manage my
business or my personal life.
I am not related in any way to William D. Faler.
Neither William D. Faler nor any member of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo,
P.L.L.C. has any right whatsoever to manage my business or any part of my
personal life.
William D. Faler has never been involved in my business in any manner
whatsoever.
The sole relationship between William D. Faler and Holden, Kidwell, Hahn &
Crapo, P.L.L.C. on the one part, and myself on the other, is that Mr. Faler and
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. were hired by me and ultimately
directed by me to defend a lawsuit brought against me by High Valley Concrete,
Inc., and to prosecute a claim that I am the sole owner of, against Doyle Beck.
In November 2007, I paid Glendale Construction the sum of $5,000.00 on my
debt to Glendale Construction.
In December 2007, I paid an additional amount (I believe to have been $3,000.00)
on my debt to Glendale Construction.
There is no timetable or required repayment date for my debt to Glendale
Construction and my understanding is that there is no expectation or demand for
immediate payment of that debt. I believe that payment status was confirmed by
Gene Sluder in his testimony at the trial of this matter.
In January 2008, I was current on my bills and had sufficient h d s to pay the
200 1 tax obligation.
As to my obligation to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. and William D.
Faler, my arrangement was that no payment was due for attorney fees and costs in
either the defense of the High Valley Concrete, Inc., lawsuit or the prosecution of
my claim against Doyle Beck until after the conclusion of those matters.
Although I understood two billings were prepared in January and March 2004, I
did not receive copies of those billings in conformity with the above agreement
and thus no payment was due from me at the time the security agreement was
granted to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C.

Affidavit of Carey Sargent
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16.

In January 2008, I was current on all of my bills, including the tax bill which I
believe was paid.

17.

In any event, I started the month of January 2008, with $7,800.00 in my bank
account and ended the month with $3,300.00 in the bank and all of my currently
due bills paid.

18.

I had paid all of my business expenses and in fact had a credit with at least one
creditor as of the end of January 2008.

19.

My house payment and utilities were also current.

20.

I started making payments to Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. in April
2008.

Dated this 2 T day of April, 2008.

1

State of Idaho
County of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this zCl%ay of April, 2008.
h
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Notary Public ibr Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifL that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 24" day of April, 2008.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

Affidavit of Cary Sargent

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[ ]U.S.Mail
[ &Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
G \WPDATA\WDF\_ClientFila R-S\Sargcnt 1082nWord ProcessingWefenseWostludgment Collectionswdavit
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DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
JntY of Fremont State of Idaho

b

..2d:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE c

O

L

~

~

N

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-02-0484
Plaintiff,
VS.

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

NOTICE

Defendant.

The Court held a hearing yesterday on High Valley's motion contesting Mr.
Sargent's exemption claim for his counsel's fees. Mr. Faler took a sizeable security
interest in Mr. Sargent's property. An ethical issue was briefly raised, whether SargentFaler transaction created a conflict of interest.
The Court gave Mr. Faler 14 days to submit further briefing, and it gave Mr.
Smith 7 d q s thereafter. Ificluded in thst briefing, the Cocrt \r;ould like the parties to

address I.R.P.C. 1.8(a). The ethical issue may be irrelevant to the issue before the
Court-whether

to deny Mr. Sargent's exemption as an unlawful transfer. But the Court

will allow the parties to argue I.R.P.C. 1.8(a)'s applicability in their briefs.

Dated this -

Notice
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I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was
served upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this
of April, 2008, unless otherwise indicated:

Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
P.O. Box 50731
414 Schoup Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
John Ohman
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
William D. Faler
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Clerk of the Court

By:

Notice
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day

, HICT SEVEN COURT
Couniv of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:

William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HaHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

1 5 '1008
By:

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-02-00484

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF WILLIAM D. FALER

VS.
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney of record on behalf of Cary Sargent in the above-entitled matter
and I make the statements herein based upon my own personal knowledge unless
otherwise stated.

2.

Cary Sargent retained myself and the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo,
P.L.L.C. to provide him legal counsel and representation in a lawsuit filed by
High Valley Concrete, LLC through Doyle Beck against himself plus representing
Cary Sargent in a lawsuit against Doyle Beck for his "lost" interest in High Valley
Concrete, LLC.

3.

On information and belief, Doyle Beck had "kicked" Cary Sargent out of High
Valley Concrete, LLC, and thus Cary Sargent had no job, no income, no means of
paying in advance for the necessary legal services.

Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler
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Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. agreed to provide the legal services
with payment for the attorney fees and costs to be made either from the proceeds
of any verdict rendered in Cary Sargent's favor or fiom other assets.
In the beginning, the action filed by High Valley Concrete, ELC was very
insignificant and it was my belief that Cary had a much larger claim against High
Valley Concrete, LLC which would be filed as a counterclaim against High Valley
Concrete, LLC.
Subsequently it was determined that Cary's claim was against Doyle Beck
personally instead of High Valley Concrete, LLC.
In August 2006, High Valley Concrete, LLC filed a Motion to Amend Complaint,
the proposed Amended Complaint increased High Valley Concrete's claim against
Cary Sargent significantly.
At that point, the legal services required by myself and Holden, Kidwell, Hahn
and Crapo, P.L.L.C. were changed from mainly prosecuting a counterclaim to
both prosecuting a plaintiffs claim and defending a significant claim against him.
Although legal services were being provided to Cary Sargent by myself and the
law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.E.L.C., there was no obligation
for Cary to actually pay for any of those services until after the trial in the matter
was completed.
Cary Sargent was not, and is not now, in default on any obligation to pay Holden,
Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo, P.L.L.C. and to the best of my knowledge is not
insolvent as a result of legal fees.
Only a portion of the legal fees secured by the Security Agreement were
antecedent to the date of that agreement.
Legal services provided to Cary Sargent during January and February of 2008 for
the prosecution of the claim against Doyle Beck and the defense of the High
Valley Concrete, LLC's claims was $56,000.00.

I am still the attorney of record in the matter and have continued to provide legal
counsel to Cary Sargent since the completion of the trial in early February 2008.
Since February 2008, additional fees have been incurred in the amount of
$12,004.00 for post-judgment motions and hearings.

Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler
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15.

With the filing of the Notices of Appeal by High Valley Concrete and Cary
Sargent, it is my belief that additional fees will be incurred between $30,000.00
and $50,000.00.

16.

The fees incurred during the trial, for post-trial motions, the fees to be incurred in
the future during the appeal process are not antecedent to the Security Agreement.

Dated this $/%ay

of May, 2008.

0

State of Idaho

)
:SS
County of Bonneville )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

)IJ; i-r\

day of May, 2008.

Residing at: f l L w
Commission Expires:

Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that 1am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this fc/Lday of May, 2008.
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler

ATTORNEYS SERVED:

[

] Hand Delivery

cGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.E.E.C.
14 Shoup Avenue

Cox Ohman & Brandstetter

William D Faler
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
G \WPDATA\WDA-Client F i l a R-S\Sargent 1082nWord ProcessingU)efensc\Post Judgment CollenionsbWidavit - WDF 2.wpd
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William D. Faler, Esq.
~dahoState Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN CRAPO, P.L-L.C1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18

1 5 2008
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Attorneys for Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
PlaintiffIResgondent,
VS.
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant/Appellant .

Case No. CV-02-00484

SARGENT'S MEMORANDUM
REGARDING SECURITY
AGREEMENT

COMES NOW, Cary Sargent, by and through his attorney of record William D. Faler, of
the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and hereby submits this Memorandum
Regarding the Security Agreement filed in the above-matter.

I.
RULE 1.8 I.R.P.C. IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PENDING MOTION
TO SET ASIDE THE SECURITY AGREEMENT
It is Cary Sargent's (hereafter "Sargent") and Hoiden, Kidwell, Hahn and Crapo,

P.L.L.C.'s (hereafter "Holden Kidwell) position that Rule 1.8(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct does not ~rohibitthe security interest that Sargent gave to Holden Kidwell
Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement
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on his cause of action against Doyle Beck (hereafter "Beck") and any verdict rendered on such
course of action. Rule 1.8(a)'s key term is "adverse" to the client. Because the security interest
provided by Sargent to Holden Kidwell was not adverse to the client's interest, there was no
violation of IRPC 1&a).
Sargent's primary interest was in having legal counsel continue to represent him in the
matters that ultimately went to trial in late January, 2008. Two specific matters were involved.
One was the prosecution of a plaintiffs claim against Doyle Beck. The second was the defense
of a claim brought by High Valley Concrete, Inc (hereafter High Valley Concrete").
Several months prior to the commencement of the trial, Sargent and Holden Kidwell
commenced discussions about how Holden Kidwell would be paid for the legal representation
that had been provided to that point in time in prosecuting the one claim and defending the other;

and the work that still needed to be done to prepare for trial, prosecute a i d defend the two
matters at trial and collect any judgment that might be obtained. Sargent was very specific in his
directions to Holden Kidwell in that he wanted to make sure that Holden Kidwell would be paid
for the legal services that had already been provided and those which were to be provided in
November and December of 2007, and January and February of 2008, and in the future as it was
almost certain there would be an appeal of the trial verdicts.
Sargent and Holden Kidwell had agreed at the start of the attorney-client relationship that
Sargent would not be expected to pay for the legal services until after verdicts were received.
Two billings were prepared by Holden Kidwell very early in the case but again payment was not
expected until a verdict was received. After the first two billings, it was decided not to continue
the practice of preparing billings because of problems it caused in the time and cost billing

;argent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement
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software. Both matters were being handled on an hourly basis. Part of these discussions
centered on reactions Beck might have to an adverse verdict against him and actions that he
might cause High Valley Concrete to take if any adverse verdict was directed to Sargent. The
primary interest of Sargent was that legal services continue to be provided to him in both
matters. As such, Sargent had a valid reason for providing the security interest to Holden

Kidwell and the providing of the same was not adverse to his interests.
There was never any intent for Holden Kidwell to be adverse to Sargent. The security
interest which was received does not operate in a way adverse to Sargentysinterests. Rather, the
security interest was helpfbl to Sargent in that it allowed him to continue to receive legal services
from Holden Kidwell through the months leading up to trial, during the trial itself, and for posttrial matters. At the same time, it gave some protection to Holden Kidwell in continuing to
provide legal services leading up to the trial and through the uial and through post-trial motions.
The second reason that IRBC 1.8(a) is not applicable is that IRPC 1.8(a) is for the
protection of the client - in this case Sargent. The present motion before the Court is High Valley
Concrete's, not Sargent's. There is no protection for High Valley Concrete arising from IRPC
1.8(a) or its application. Rule 1.8(a) is simply not applicable to the present matter before the
Court. High Valley Concrete has no standing to claim any benefit or application from the rule in
the relationship between Sargent and Holden Kidwell.

PI.
ADEOUATE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN FOR SECURITY INTEREST
High Valley Concrete and Beck claim that the security agreement and lien arising from
that security agreement is an unlawful transfer that should be voided by the Court. Idaho Code

Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement
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Section 55-912 defines value as it relates to unlawful transfers. Sub-part (1) provides that value
is given if an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied.
Sargent retained Holden Kidwell shortly after Beck kicked Sargent out of High Valley
Concrete. After being "kicked out", Sargent had no job, no income and, thus, no means of
paying in advance for the necessary legal services to fight Beck. Holden Kidwell agreed to
provide legal services with payment to be made either from the proceeds of any verdict rendered
in Sargent's favor or his own income/assets. The action against Sargent was very insignificant at
the time the fee arrangement was agreed upon, and the thinking was that Sargent's claim would
be the far larger claim. At the time it was also believed that thinking Sargent's claim would be
against High Valley Concrete. Thus the defense of High Valley Concrete's claims would be
minimal and the effort for the prosecution of the counterclaim far greater.
Subsequently it was determined that Sargent's claim would be against Beck personally. It
was not until October 2006 that High Valley Concrete claims against Sargent were increased
greatly. The legal services changed from mostly being provided for a plaintiffs claim to being
provided for both a plaintiffs claim and the defense of a highly inflated and fabricated claim
against Sargent.
As to those legal services provided prior to the security agreement the securing of the
debt for those services, provided value as defined by Idaho Code Section 55-912.
111.
SARGENT WAS NOT INSOLVENT
It should be noted that High Valley Concrete's claim as originally filed in 2002 was for
the return of a cell phone, the use of post office box and access to a bank account. Those were

Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement
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the claims that existed in High Valley Concrete's matter against Cary Sargent until late August
of 2006, when High Valley Concrete filed a motion to amended its claim. High Valley Concrete
now argues that its claims against Sargent of $600,000.00 plus existed from at least February
2002. Those claims were alleged to have roots in the relationship between Beck and Sargent in
High Valley Concrete which operated from 1997 through February 2002, but even High Valley
Concrete would be hard pressed to say that they knew they had a $600,000.00 claim against Cary
Sargent in February 2002. If they did, why was there not an amended claim until October of
2006, four and a half years later. The fact is that while the dispute arose out of that relationship,
the jury certainly did not find that anything near $600,000.00 of claims were valid. Rather only
approximately only 8% of High Valley Concrete's claims were accepted by the jury. High
Valley Concrete, however, wants the Court to accept the $600,000.00 of claims that the jury
found were not valid and not justified as a basis for finding the insolvency of Cary Sargent.
The truth is that Beck kicked Sargent out of High Valley Concrete and took almost all of
Sargent's assets in February 2002. It would be blatantly unfair to hold that Sargent was insolvent
because of a claimed debt to High Valley Concrete when the lack of assets and a job were created
by High Valley Concrete. At the time the security agreement was taken, Sargent and Holden
Kidwell believed that the claims against Sargent by High Valley Concrete were not valid but
instead ridiculous. The jury agreed with us in that assessment and found that 92% of the claimed
debt was not valid.

A.

Cary Sargent was not I[nsolvent as a Result of any Glendale Construction, Inc. Debt.
High Valley Concrete claims Sargent was insolvent because he owed Glendale

Construction md had not paid the debt. High Valley Concrete conveniently overlooks the

Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement
Page 259

testimony of Gene Sluder in the trial of this matter wherein he testified that the company of
which he was president, Glendale Construction, Inc., did not expect Sargent to pay any debt to
Glendale until Sargent was financially able to make such payments and that the payment
schedule was up to Sargent. Thus there was not a due date for the Glendale obligations. If High
Valley Concrete's position is accepted by the Court, then anyone who has purchased a piece of
property on a promissory note, mortgage, etc. would likely be insolvent because the entire
amount of the note would be due as of day one. That simply was not case, and is not the case
regarding any debt owed by Sargent to Glendale. Sargent was in fact paying Glendale according
to the terms of their agreement. See the Affidavit of Cary Sargent filed on April 29,2008.

B.

Cary Sargent was not Insolvent because of any Holden Kidwell Legal Fees/Costs
Obligation.
Sargent needed legal representation as a result of Beck's antics and claims under the guise

of High Valley Concrete. He arranged for that legal representation in the only way he could, and
that was with the expectation that he would be able to pay for such fees and costs after the matter
was finally tried and a verdict was rendered in his favor. Although legal services were being
provided to Sargent by Holden Kidwell, there was no obligation to actually gay for those services

until the trial was completed, Therefore, Sargent was not in default on any obligation to pay
Holden Kidwell and was not insolvent as a result of the legal fees. Given that understanding, the
obligations to Wolden Kidwell were not due at the time the security interest was provided and
Sargent should not be found to be insolvent because of an obligation that was not yet due.

High Valley Concrete has not shown that Sargent did not have sufficient assets to pay his
debts. In order to avail itself of the insolvency argument, it must prove that Sargent is in fact
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insolvent. It has not done so.

IV.
HOLDEN KIDWELL IS NOT AN INSIDER
Idaho Code Section 55-914(2) provides that a transfer is fraudulent only if each of the
following conditions exist:
1.

The claim of the creditor arose before the transfer was made;

2.

The transfer was made to an insider;

3.

'Fhe transfer was for an antecedent debt;

4.

The debtor was insolvent; and

5.

The insider had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent.

If any one or more of the five items does not exist, there is no fraudulent transfer under
Idaho Code Section 55-9 14(2).
High Valley Concrete argues that Holden Kidwell was an "insider" to Sargent under the
UnlawfUl Transfers Act at the time the security interest was created. High Valley Concrete
contends that Holden Kidwell, or one or more of its attorneys, somehow was a managing agent of
Sargent and an "insider" on that basis. The term "managing agent" is defined by Ballentine's
Law Dictionary as, "a person to whom a corporation has given general powers involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion in conducting the corporation's business."
The fact is that none of the attorneys of Holden Kidwell have ever had any right or ability
or have in fact ever sought to manage or direct any of Sargent's activities in operating his
concrete business or m i n g his life. Rather, the only involvement of Holden Kidwell, or any of
its attorneys, was in providing legal services to Sargent as an independent contractor. If the
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flawed logic of Beck and High Valley Concrete is followed, any attorney who ever provided
legal services to any client would therefore be a managing agent of that client and thereby subject
to potential liability. Such a result is simply not logical, feasible or fair, and we believe it is not
what was intended under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. It would surprise us greatly, if
High Valley Concrete's counsel honestly believes he is the managing agent of Beck or any of
Beck's companies, or even of High Valley Concrete itself just because he provides legal
representation to Beck or a Beck company. If so, he practices a much different scope of law than
does Holden Kidwell. In our firm,the ultimate direction that a client's case takes is the decision
of the client. We advise the client of his rights, the law, his options, what he can or cannot do,
who he should call as witnesses, etc., but the ultimate decision as to the course of the case is
made by the client. An example would be an appeal. We advise the client and the client, not
Holden Kidwell, decides whether to appeal or not. As such, we are at the most inferior agents not managing agents.
High Valley Concrete has not cited a case where an attorney representing a client in a
litigation is held to be a managing agent of the client or an insider of a client. Research done on
behalf of Sargent has not located a case holding an attorney to be an insider simply because he
provides legal services for litigation.

v.
NOT ALE OF THE LEGAL SERVICES WERE ANTECEDENT
TO THE SECURITY INTEREST
Only part of the legal services provided by HoIden Kidwell to Sargent were provided
before the security interest was provided by Sargent to Holden Kidwell, During January and
February of 2008, the legal services provided to Sargent on the High Valley Concrete claim were
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$28,499.00 and the legal services provided for the prosecution of the claim against Beck
resulting in the judgment against Beck for the same time period, January and February 2008,
were $27,501"00for a total of the two claims for that time period of $56,000.00. Since February
2008, Holden Kidwell has provided legal services to Sargent in the amount of $12,004.00. It is
also expected that with appeals and motions, such as the present motion, Sargent will incur
additional fees of $20,000.00 to $30,000.00. If a new trial is needed, additional fees in the range
of another $30,000.00 to $50,000.00 will be incurred. Certainly the legal fees for those services
are not antecedent debts.
Thus, attorney fees already incurred of at least $66,000.00 were not antecedent. The
security agreement is at the very least valid as to that amount plus whatever additional fees and
costs are incurred in the future. Because at least $66,000.00 of the legal services and costs are
not antecedent, High Valley Concrete's motion must be denied.

we
THE CREATION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER UNDER IDAHO CODE SECTION 55-913
Idaho Code Section 55-913 provides that, "a transfer made, or obligation incurred by a
debtor is a fraudulent as to a creditor.... if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation;
a) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud.... or b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent

value in exchange for the transfer..." The security interest granted to Holden Kidwell was
provided by Sargent in return for receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer (security agreement). There is no evidence before the Court that the services provided by
Holden Kidwell and the services to be provided by Holden Kidwell were unreasonable. That fact
alone takes the security interest given by Sargent to Holden Kidwell out of the operation of Idaho
3 - Memnrand~~rn
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Code Section 55-913. No one has argued (or could reasonably or truthfully argue) that Sargent
did not receive legal services and the legal services were not both reasonable and for the most
part successful in lessening the liability of Sargent (by 92%) and in recovering a verdict against
Beck. Given that fact, the security interest granted to Holden Kidwell cannot be voided pursuant
to Idaho Code Section 55-913 regardless of whether the Court addresses the alleged "insider"
argument, or the "intent to hinder" argument, or the "insolvency" argument presented by High
Valley Concrete.

VII*
THE CREATION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER UNDER IDAHO CODE SECTION 55-914!a)
In order for a transfer to be fi-audulentunder the terms of Idaho Code Section 55-914(a)
the transfer would have to be made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the transfer regardless of insolvency. The creation of the security agreement was for legal
services provided and constitutes a reasonably equivalent value. No showing of
unreasonableness, or not receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the security
agreement has been made by High Valley Concrete.

WII.
HQEDEN KIDWELL HAS A CHARGING LIEN PURSUANT TO IDAHO LAW
Idaho Code Section 3-205 provides that an attorney who appears for a party in an action
has a lien on the client's cause of action which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment
in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever's hands they may come. From the
commencement of arm action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney
who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim which
In

- Mornnr~ndrxrnRorrardinn Corrrri+v Interact

Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement
Page 264

attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in
whosoever's hands they may come. The effect of Idaho Code Section 3-205 is to create an
attorney's charging lien. See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 928 (1983).
A charging lien is not dependant upon possession. A charging lien is equitable in nature,

and such equitable nature requires that the attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative
process to reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the Court. See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho
463,660 P.2d 928 (1983). Holden Kidwell is in the process of doing just that.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 3-205, the commencement of an action or service of a
cobnterclaim creates the attorney's charging lien on the verdict rendered, judgment entered or
settlement proceeds obtained. See White v. St.Alphonsus, 01.17 ICAR 722. The White Court
noted that Idaho Code Section 3-205 provides in part, "... fiom the commencement of an action,
or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a
lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision
or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come..."
Regardless of the validity of the written Security Interest that High Valley Concrete seeks
to void, Holden Kidwell has a lien on the proceeds of the judgment rendered against Beck.

CONCLUSION
Sargent and his attorneys, Holden KidwelI, respectfully request that the Court deny High
Valley Concrete's Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption
Pbs the following reasons:
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1.

Holden Kidwell provided adequate consideration to Sargent for the security
interest by providing legal services both before and after the date of the Security
Agreement.

2.

Sargent was not insolvent at the time he provided the Security Agreement to
Holden Kidwell.

3.

Holden Kidwell was not the managing agent of Sargent and thus is not an insider
as required by Idaho Code Section 55-914(2).

4.

Only part of the debt for the legal services was antecedent to the providing of the
Security Agreement, and the part that is not antecedent plus the amounts that will
almost certainly be incurred in the pending appeals, more than exceeds the
judgment in the Sargent v. Beck matter.

5.

IFh Security Agreement was not a fraudulent transfer under Idaho Code Section
55-913 because Sargent received a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the Security Agreement.

6.

The Security Agreement was not a fraudulent transfer under Idaho Code Section
55-914(1) as reasonable value was given by Holden Kidwell for the Security
Agreement by continuing to provide legal services to Sargent and by providing
legal services that were antecedent.

7.

Holden Kidwell has a charging lien on Sargent's verdict, judgment and the
proceeds thereof that is not defeated by a Judgment Creditor attempting to attach
the verdict or judgment.
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Sargent and Holden Kidwell further believe that IRPC 1.8(a) has no application to the
present motion before the Court.
Dated this /4/Qay of May, 2008.

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an
Idaho limited liability company,
Case No. CV-02-0484
Plaintiff,
VS.
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONTEST CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION AND THIRD-PARTY
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

Defendants.
1.

INTRODUCTION.
Pursuant to this court's notice dated ApriI 30,2008 ("Notice"), the plaintiff, High

Valley Concrete, L.L.C. ("High Valley") files this brief in support of its motion to contest
the claims of exemption filed by the judgment-debtor, Cary Sargent ("Sargent"), and
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC ("Faler's Firm"), the law firm of Sargent's
lawyer, William D. Faler. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the court should
grant High Valley's motion and deny Sargent's claim of exemption and Faler7sFirm's
third-party claim of exemption.
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DOCUMENT.
SCANNED

SARGENT GAVE THE SECURITY INTEREST TO FALER'S FIRM THREE
DAYS AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL.

11.

The security agreement Faler's Firm relies on in its claim of exemption is dated
Saturday, January 26,2008. Trial in this matter began on Wednesday, January 23,2008.
Thus, Sargent and Faler's Firm executed the security agreement three days after trial began,
not before trial as High Valley previously mentioned.' Thus, three days into trial, Faler was
concerned that High Valley could get a large judgment against Sargent and then execute on
all of Sargent7sassets. If that happened, Faler's Firm would not get paid. So to ensure its
own payment, Faler's Firm acted on its inside information and took a security interest in all
of Sargent7sassets.
FALER'S FIRM'S SECURITY INTEREST IN SARGENT7SASSETS IS
PROHIBITED BECAUSE FALER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH IDAHO
RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(a).

111.

In its Notice, the court specifically requested the parties address Idaho Rule of
Professional Conduct I .8(a), which provides as follows:
Rule 1.8: Conflict Of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules
(a)

A lawyer shaII not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1)

the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be
reasonably understood by the client;

(2)

the client is advised in writing of the desirability of
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the
advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

1

See p. 3 of High Valley's Brief In Support Of Motion To Contest Claim Of Exemption And Third-Party
Claim Of Exemption, already on file with the court. Sargent's security agreement is dated 3 days after trial
began, not 27 days before trial began.
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(3)

the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by
the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the
lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the
lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

Rule I .8(a) does not merely discourage a lawyer from obtaining a security interest
adverse to the client, but prohibits it. This prohibition is in effect unless and until the lawyer
complies with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a).
Here, it is undisputed that Faler's Firm acquired a security interest in what appears to
be all of Sargent's present and fiture assets. Faler's Firm has presented no evidence that it
advised Sargent "in writing of the desirability of seeking . . . the advice of independent legal
counsel" or that it gave Sargent "a reasonable opportunity to seek" such counsel. I.R.P.C.
1.8(a). Faler's Firm has presented no evidence that Sargent gave "informed consent, in a
writing signed by [Sargent] to the essential terms of the [security interest] and the lawyer's
role in the transaction." Id. In short, Faler's Firm engaged in a prohibited business
transaction with its client to the prejudice of creditor's like High Valley.
Instead of complying with Rule 1 $(a), Faler's Firm tries to avoid application of the
rule by arguing that the rule does not apply because Faler's Firm's interest is not "adverse"
to Sargent. Apparently, just as Faler could not see the conflict in representing both Sargent
and co-defendant Glendale Construction, Inc. ("Glendale"), Faler cannot see the conflict in
representing Sargent while taking a security interest in all of Sargent's property. By Faler's
Firm's own admission, Sargent is in debt to the firm for nearly $200,000. While Sargent has
a possessory interest in his property, Faler's Firm claims a security interest in that same
property. The conflict between Faler's Firm collecting this sizeable debt and Sargent
keeping his property is obvious. Faler's Firm's claim that "[tlhere was never any intent for
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[Faler's Firm] to be adverse to sargentV2is irrelevant. Rule I .8(a) does not provide an
exception for the lawyer that has no "intent'' to act adversely to his client.
Moreover, Rule 1.8(a) is specifically designed to address the very conflict between
Faler's Firm and Sargent at issue in this motion to contest the claim of exemption.
Paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct explains, "Virtually
all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living." This is exactly the "conflict" Faler's Firm

has right now. Faler owes a fiduciary duty to place his client's interests ahead of his
own. However, Faler also has an interest in "earning a satisfactory living." When such
conflicts arise, Rule 1.8(a) sets forth mandatory safeguards to protect the conflicting
interests of the lawyer and the client. Faler's Firm has not complied with these
mandatory safeguards. As such Faler's Firm's security interest in its client's property is a
prohibited transaction.
Faler's Firm makes one final argument that High Valley has no standing to claim
any protection from Rule 1.8(a) because the transaction is between only Faler's Firm and
Sargent. However, a lawyer's duty often extends beyond the duty to his client. For
example, lawyers owe certain minimum duties to non-client heirs to prepare testamentary
documents in a competent manner. See, e.g., Harrig$eld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136
(2004). Lawyers also owe an independent duty to the integrity of the legal system, a duty
that would necessarily include compliance with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
Not only does High Valley have standing to challenge the legality of Faler's Firm's

2

See p. 3 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
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security interest, but this court has the right and the obligation to review the propriety of
such an agreement and to set it aside because Faler's Firm has not complied with the
mandatory prerequisites for obtaining a valid security interest in Sargent's property.
Faler's Firm realized three days into trial that High Valley could get a large
judgment against Sargent. High Valley could then execute on all of Sargent's assets and
Faler's Firm would not get paid. To ensure his own ability to "earn[] a satisfactory living,"
Faler acted on his inside information and took a security interest in all of Sargent's assets in
violation of Rule 1.8(a).
IV.

FALER'S FIRM HAS NO ATTORNEY'S CHARGING LIEN IN SARGENT'S
JUDGMENT.
Faler's Firm has no attorney's charging lien against Sargent's judgment under Idaho

Code Section 3-205 for two reasons. First, Faler's Firm has waived its right to any lien
under Section 3-205. Idaho Code Section 1 1-203 states, "A third party claimant shall
prepare a written claim settingforth the grounds upon which he claims the property . . ."
(Emphasis added.) Then, the "third party claim shall be delivered or mailed to the sheriff
within fourteen (14) days" after the sheriff serves the claim of exemption. I.C. 5 11-203(a).
Here, Faler's Firm failed to timely "set[] forth the grounds upon which [it] claims
the property." In its third party claim, Faler's Firm did not make any reference to an
attorney's lien or to Idaho Code Section 3-205. Faler's Firm failed to assert Section 3-205
before the expiration of the 14-day period to file its third party claim of exemption. In fact,
Faler's Firm did not assert Section 3-205 in response to High Valley's motion to contest the
third party claim of exemption at any time before or at the hearing. Faler's Firm may have
had multiple grounds for claiming Sargent's judgment was exempt from execution, but the
- ..
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only grounds it asserted was the security agreement. Faler's Firm waived any lien it had
under Section 3-205.
Moreover, even had Faler's Firm not waived the Section 3-205 attorney's charging
lien, Faler's Firm did not taken the necessary steps to perfect the lien. The Idaho Supreme
Court stated, "The equitable source of the claimed charging lien necessitates that an attorney
take affirmative steps in an adjudicativeprocess to perfect and reduce his lien to a
judgment or order of the court." Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466 (1983) (emphasis

added). Faler's Firm has not taken any affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to
"perfect" its attorney's lien by reducing it "to a judgment or order of the court." Id. Faler's
Firm's lien has not been reviewed and adjudicated by any court. Faler's Firm is now too
late to attempt to perfect its attorney's lien because High Valley has already executed on the
very judgment in which Faler's Firm now asserts the lien. For a lienholder to enjoy the h l l
benefits of a lien, the lienholder must have perfected the lien and not merely be "in the
process" of perfecting the lien. Just as in Frazee, Faler's Firm has failed to perfect its
potential attorney's charging lien under Section 3-205.

V.

FALER'S FIRM SOUGHT THE "PROTECTION" OF THE SECURITY
INTEREST BECAUSE IT HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
SARGENT WAS INSOLVENT AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER.
The issue under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") is whether Faler's

Firm had reasonable cause to believe that Sargent was insolvent. I.C. 5 55-914(2).
Faler's Firm's own admission that the security interest gave it "some protection . . .
in continuing to provide legal servicesv3highlights the fact that Faler's Firm knew Sargent
was insolvent at the time the parties created the security interest. Faler's Firm needed no

---- - .----- -- - -- ---
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protection if Sargent was solvent. Faler's Firm probably doesn't require all of its clients
(such as the City of Idaho Falls or Ball Ventures, LLC) to sign agreements granting a
security interest in all of the clients' assets before proceeding with representation. However,
in this case Faler's Firm knew something about Sargent's financial condition that caused
Faler's Firm to seek "some protection." Perhaps Faler's Firm noted that as of January 26,
2008, Sargent owed Faler's Firm approximately $1 16,814.59and had not made any
payments in the 6 previous years the case was pending.4 Perhaps Faler's Firm realized
Sargent had not paid Glendale on the $41'8 16.77 debt he owed to Glendale since ApriI
2004.~Perhaps Faler's Firm noted that Sargent has not been paying his income taxes as
they came due, having paid his 200 1 federal taxes on or about December 12,2007.~At any
rate, three days into trial Faler's Firm knew Sargent was insolvent and determined that it
needed "someprotection" that Sargent would pay his bill. The security interest in all of
Sargent's assets executed three days into trial was Faler's Firm's response to Sargent's
insolvency.
VI.

SARGENT IS PRESUMED INSOLVENT AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER
TO FALER'S FIRM AND FALER'S FIRM HAS SUBMITTED NO EVIDENCE
TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT SARGENT WAS INSOLVENT.
Idaho's UFTA provides that "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his . . . debts as

they become due is presumed to be insolvent." I.C. 5 55-911(2). High Valley has already

--

3

-

See p. 3 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
(Emphasis added.)
See Exhibits "A" and "B" to the Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees
and Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High
Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the court.
See High Valley Trial Exhibit #28 and the trial testimony of Cary Sargent and Kim Allen.
See Cary Sargent's 2001 federal income tax return attached as Exhibit " B to the Affidavit of Bryan D.
Smith dated April 18, 2008, already on file with the court.
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provided numerous examples that Sargent was "generally not paying his debts" as they
became due at the time he transferred the security interest to Faler's ~irrn.'
Instead of providing evidence that Sargent was solvent and was generally paying his
debts as they became due, Faler's Firm attempts to explain away the repeated examples of
Sargent's failure to pay his debts. As for Sargent's failure to timely pay his debt to Faler's
Firm, Faler's Firm argues that they had not yet "become due" because "there was no
obligation to actually pay for those [legal] services until the trial was completed."*
Assuming this is correct, the court should note that three weeks after trial, Sargent still had
not made any payment on his bi1L9 Faler's Firm has submitted no evidence that Sargent has
paid anything since the concIusion of trial. Faler's Firm also gives the excuse that it did not
regularly bill Sargent "because of problems . . . in the time and cost billing s o f t ~ a r e . " ' ~
Faler's Firm had sent out at least two bills to Sargent, one in January 2004 for $13,278.27,
and one in March 2004 for $13'443.27." Both bills state on the first page, "Interest will be
charged at the rate of 1% per month (12% per annum) on outstanding accounts over 30
days. Please make checks payable to Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo and include file # on
checks."12 Based on Faler's Firm's o w bilis, Sargent has not even paid the interest due on

7

See p. 10-1 I of High Valley's Brief In Support Of Motion To Contest Claim Of Exemption And ThirdParty Claim Of Exemption, already on file with the court. See also Section V, supra.
8
See p. 6 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
9
See Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs on Behalf of
Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High Valley Concrete, LLC v.
Sargent, already on file with the court.
lo See p. 2 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
11
See Exhibit " B to the Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and
Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High Valley
Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the rourt.
l2 See Exhibit " B to the Motion, Memoranduin of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and
Costs on Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. Beck and in the Matter of High Valley
Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the court.
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his account. Faler's Firm's explanations fcr Sargent's failure to pay anything on his bill for
six years are sham excuses for Sargent's insolvency.
Faler's Firm gives the same excuse for Sargent's failure to pay anything on his
$41,816.77 debt to Glendale as his failure to pay the debt to Faler's Firm, namely that
payment had not yet "become due" because Gene Sluder testified that he did not expect
Sargent to pay. However, Faler's Firm admits that Mr. Sluder did not expect Sargent to pay
"until Sargent wasjinancially able."13 In other words, by Mr. Sluder's own testimony,
Sargent did not pay his bill to Glendale because he was not "financially able," i.e., because
Sargent was insolvent. Faler's Firm claims that Sargent has since made some payments to
Glendale. However, the issue is not whether Sargent is insolvent now, but whether he was
insolvent at the time of the transfer. I.C. 5 55-914(2). Whether Sargent has started paying
his bills since January 26,2008, is irrelevant.
High Valley has submitted evidence that Sargent was not generally paying his debts
as they became due. Faler's Firm has tried to explain away this evidence, but has not
submitted any evidence of its own proving Sargent's solvency. In fact, in attempting to
rebut the presumption of insolvency, Faler's Firm has actually confirmed Sargent's
insolvency.
VII.

FALER'S FIRM IS AN INSIDER BECAUSE FALER'S FIRM RELIED ON ITS
CLOSE, FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP WITH SARGENT TO GAIN AN
ADVANTAGE OVER OTHER CREDITORS.
Transfers to insiders may be set aside under Idaho's UFTA. I.C. 5 55-914(a). In

this case, Faler's Firm is an insider in relation to Sargent's transfer of a security interest in
all Sargent's assets to Faler's Firm. The "insider" inquiry focuses on whether the

--.--.-

-r

-----.-.

--'
,.-rn---r-

-- ------I

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Contest Claim of
Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption
n--- 177

-?

CONTEST CLAlM OF EXEMPTlON AND
ge y

~Motion.Contest.Exemption.doc

transferee's relationship with the debtor is sufficiently close to make the transfer subject to
closer scrutiny. See In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925,934 (N.D.Ga. 1992). This
"insider" analysis "must be flexibly applied 'to include a broad range of parties who have a
close relationship with the Debtor." In re Main, blc., 2 13 B.R. 67, 8 1 (E.D.Pa. 1997). The
statutory examples of an "insider" are "merely illustrative" and the definition "must be
flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis." Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R.
438,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). At the center of the inquiry is "whether the [alleged insider] has

used an opportunity to adjust its position in such a way that other creditors are
prejudiced." In re Beverages Int 1' , Ltd. '50 B.R. 273'28 1 (Mass. 198.5).
Faler's Firm had a close, fiduciary relationship with Sargent. Faler's Firm used its
position and superior information to obtain a security interest in all of Sargent's assets to the
prejudice of all Sargent's creditors. The security agreement provided a win-win scenario for
Faler's Firm and Sargent. Faler's Firm knew Sargent was insolvent, which is why it
required the security agreement. The security agreement purports to ensure payment to
Faler's Firm. Sargent benefited by rendering himselfjudgment proof. The only losers in
the deal are Sargent's arms-length, non-insider creditors.
Faler's Firm offers no explanation why the court should not apply greater scrutiny to
Faler's Firm's security interest from Sargent. The UFTA requires a liberal construction
primarily for the benefit of creditors. not grantees, for the "purpose of giving speedy relief
against afraudulent debtor."14 (Keep in mind that the jury already found Sargent liable for
fraud in this very case.) Instead, Faler's Firm tries to distances itself from Sargent by
13

See p. 6 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
(Emphasis added.)
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offering and arguing the corporate definition of the term "managing agent," one of the
examples listed in the UFTA's definition of "insider." However, not only is the list of
"insiders" "merely illustrative," but Faler's Firm is Sargent's managing agent in this case.
Faler's Firm is not Sargent's managing agent in Sargent's concrete business or personal life,
but Faler's Firm cannot deny that it has both the power and the duty to act in Sargent's
behalf in relation to this case. Faler's Fim is not Sargent's managing agent for all purposes,
but it is clearly Sargent's managing agent for purposes of this case.
Finally, Faler's Firm argues that it should not be held an insider because it found no
cases holding lawyers as insiders. This is not surprising. For a lawyer to take a security
interest in all of his client's assets three days into trial is outrageous. The absence of a
reported case holding a lawyer as an insider under such circumstances certainly does not
preclude such a holding in this case.
VIII.

FALER'S FIRM'S UNEXPLAINED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ARE
FURTHER EVIDENCE THE SECURITY AGREEMENT IS FRAUDULENT.
At the time of his motion, memorandum and affidavit dated February 21,2008,

Faler's attorney's fees and costs were $135,917.62.15 As of May 14,2008, Faler's Firm
claims to have incurred an additional $12,004.00 in attorney's fees since February 2008.16
Thus, by Faler's own representations, his attorney's fees and cost to date should be
$1 47,921.62. However, as of one month ago, on April 10,2008, Faler's Firm claimed a
security interest in Sargent's assets in the amount of $190,874.58 for unpaid attorney's fees

14

See p. 4 of High Valley's Brief In Support Of Motion To Contest Claim Of Exemption And Third-Party
Claim Of Exemption, already on file with the court.
15
See p. 7 of the Motion, Memorandum of Fees and Costs and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs on
K in the Matter of High Valley Concrete,
Behalf of Cary Sargent in Both the Matter of Sargent v. B ~ Cand
LLC v. Sargent, already on file with the court.
16
See p. 9 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
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and costs.I7 Faler's Firm provides no explanation for the $42,952.96 difference in the
attorney's fees and costs it claimed a month ago in its third party claim of exemption
compared to the amount it reports now. The unexplained $42,952.96 is further evidence of
the security agreement is fraudulent. Faler's Firm's third party claim of exemption
oversecures Faler's Firm because the $190,874.58 does not accurately reflect Faler's Firm's
actual attorney's fees and costs to Sargent. The only thing that makes sense is that Faler's
Firm is exaggerating its security interest to defraud creditors by making Sargent even more
judgment proof. The unexplained $42,952.96 may also include prospective security for the
additional "$20,000.00 to $30,000.00" in attorney's fees and costs Faler's Firm expects to
incur-and

Sargent to not pay-in

a future appeal.

Moreover, Judge Moss previously disqualified Faler from representing Glendale
because of a conflict. Later, in Glendale's post-trial memorandum of attorney's fees and
costs, Faler attempted to pass $19,987.82 of his attorney's fees and costs through Glendale.
However, Judge St. Clair disallowed all of the attorney's fees and costs claimed from Faler.
Now, it seems Faler's Firm may be attempting to smuggle its disallowed Glendale charges
into its security agreement with Sargent to further prevent High Valley from collecting on its
judgment.
Finally, this court ruled only $51,989.50 of Faler's attorney's fees and costs were
reasonable. Nonetheless, Faler's Firm claims to be secured in the amount of $190,874.58.
The fact that Faler's Firm is so ridiculously oversecured for the reasonable value of its
attorney's fees and costs is fiu-ther evidence of the fraudulent nature of the security
agreement.

17

See p. 2 of Third Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, already on file with the court.
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FALER'S FIRM'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT.
Faler's Firm argues that it gave adequate consideration from the security agreement

with sargent.I8 While the adequacy of consideration may be an argument for challenging
contracts generally, High Valley has not asserted this challenge here. Rather, High Valley
submits that the security interest is invalid under Section 55-914(2) of Idaho's UFTA. The
adequacy of the consideration is irrelevant to the present motion.
Also, Faler's Firm's makes an argument based on Idaho Code Section 55-913.19
However, High Valley's challenge to the security interest is based on Section 55-914(2).
Section 55-913 is an entirely different code section with different requirements. Faler's
Firm's argument is irrelevant in this regard.
Further, Faler's Firm claims that while the security interest was in part to secure
payment of Sargent's antecedent debt, it was intended to secure hture debts as well.2o All
that Section 55-914(2) requires is that the debtor's transfer to the insider be for an
antecedent debt. Faler's Firm concedes that the transfer was primarily to secure the
payment of the antecedent debt. Faler's Firm's future charges to Sargent for hture services
is irrelevant.
Faler's Firm also discusses, albeit irrelevantly and erroneously, the percentage of

High Valley's recovery in relation to its claim. (High Valley sought $332,360.32 in
damages, not $600,000.00 as Faler's Finn alleges. The jury awarded $48,981.16, resulting
in a recovery percentage to High Valley of 1 596, not 8% as Faler's Firm suggests.) The

18

See pp. 3-4 and 10 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the
court.
19
See pp. 9-10 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
20 See pp. 8-9 of Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Security Agreement, already on file with the court.
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extent to which the jury agreed with High Valley's claims is irrelevant to whether the
security interest from Sargent to Faler three days into trial is a voidable, fraudulent transfer.

X.

CONCLUSION.
Based on the foregoing, the court should grant High Valley's motion and deny the

claim of exemption and the third-party claim of exemption.
DATED this

dD

day of May, 2008.
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:

L,

B. ,jf! driscoll
Atorneys for High Valley Concrete, LLC
and Doyle Beck

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 38 day of May, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing KEPLY BFUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
CONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or
overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
[ 4 . s . Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

1

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Contest Claim of
Exemption and Third-Party Cla~mof Exemption
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a

William D. Faler, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

age 14

:f.Motion.Contest.Exemption.doc

I
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUD
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE

DISTRICT SEVEN COURT

County of Frernont Stzte of Idaho

PISTRICT
..
FREMONE

Case No. CV-02-0484 &
Case No. CV-07-0118

Plaintiff,
VS.

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.
CARY SARGENT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

DOYLE BECK,
Defendant.

1. FACTS
Cary Sargent was awarded a judgment on his claim against Doyle Beck in Case
No. CV-07-0118. This judgment was amended ("Amended Judgment"). High Valley
sought to levy on Sargent's Amended Judgment. In response, Sargent filed a claim of
exemption and the law firm representing Sargent, Faler's Firm, filed a third-party claim
of exemption. Sargent's exemption claim did not mention the Amended Judgment, but
Faler's Firm's third-party exemption claim did. The Firm's exemption claim alleged that
the Amended Judgment was exempt because it was security for attorney fees Sargent
the f i r m D O c l l f , j , ~ ~ ~
Aemorandum Decision
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I

-- ----- rleputy

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

1

Clerk ,

High Valley challenges the third-party exemption claiming it violated the rules of
professional conduct, failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 11-203, and qualified
as a fraudulent transfer.

2. DISCUSSION
1. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) does not forbid the security
agreement between Mr. Sargent and Mr. Faler.
"A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly acquire [a] security or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client."' Faler's Firm has a security interest in over $190,000 of its client's,

Mr. Sargent's, property. It is easy to see potential conflicts of interest between the Firm's
interest in Sargent's property and Sargent's interests. But, Rule 1.8(a) requires a live
adverse interest, and there is no evidence before the Court that such a conflict currently
exists. The Faler-Sargent security agreement does not presently violate Rule 1.8(a).
2. Faler's Firm's third-party exemption claim satisfied the requirements of
Idaho Code Section 11-203.
Section 1 1-203 places several obligations on one claiming an exemption from a
levy. One requirement is that the individual name the property being claimed as exempt.
High Valley correctly argues that Sargent's Claim of Exemption fails to mention
Sargent's Amended Judgment. Since the only property High Valley sought to levy
against was Sargent's judgment, and since Sargent failed to claim the judgment exempt,
Sargent may not claim the judgment as an exemption.
However, Faler's Firm may claim the exemption as a third-party claim, which
they have. There is no reason why Sargent's failure to include the Amended Judgment
should affect Faler's Firm's exemption claim when the firm included it in its third-party
claim. The firm satisfied the procedural requirements of Section 11-203 in claiming its
exemption.

1 ~ r l - h
P ~ Z InPf p r n f ~ c ~ i n nC]nnd~~ct
al
Rule
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1.8(a) (emphasis added).

3. The Faler-Sargent security agreement was not an unlawful transfer because
Faler's Firm is not an insider.
High Valley moves the Court to avoid the Faler-Sargent security agreement and
deny Faler's Firm's third-party claim of exemption per Idaho's Unlawful Transfers Act.
There are four prerequisites for an unlawful t r a n ~ f e r .The
~ prerequisite the Court focuses
on is the requirement that the transfer must be to an insider.
The Act includes several definitions of insider, but only one is applicable here: a

managing agent is an insider.l The Act fails to define managing agent. So the issue the
Court must decide is whether Faler's Firm was Mr. Sargent's managing agent.
Black's Law Dictionary defines managing agent as "[a] person with the general
power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as opposed to an ordinary agent
who acts under the direction and control of the principal."4
As High Valley's counsel argues in its brief, an attorney exercises "judgment and
discretion" for the benefit of a client, the principal. For example, an effective, efficient
attorney exercises "judgment and discretion" when he advises a client to settle rather than
incur the costs of lengthy litigation. However, it does not follow that this exercise of
"judgment and discretion" turns the attorney into his client's managing agent. Clients
may snub counsel, reject settlement offers, and continue a protracted wrangle. Attorneys
do not exercise "judgment and discretion" over their clients-attorneys

are under the

direction and control of their clients.
Attorneys are agents, but they are limited agents.5 Attorneys are limited in the
scope of their client's representation: a lawyer "shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation ... shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued .. . may take such action on behalf of the client as
is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation," and "shall abide by a client's
decision whether to settle a matter."6 Rule 1.2(a) "confers upon the client the ultimate

* I.C.

55-914(2).
I.C. 5 55-910(7)(e).
4
Black's Law Dictionary (8' Ed.).
5
Id. (see definitions of attorney and agent).
TA-hr.
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authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits
imposed by law and the lawyer's professional ~ b l i ~ a t i o n s .Attorneys
"~
are under the
direction and control of their clients; attorneys are not managing agents.
Here, the Court has nothing before it to suggest that Faler's Firm is anything more
than Mr. Sargent's agent. The Firm does not manage, direct, or control Mr. Sargent.
Consequently, Faler's Firm is not an insider and the Faler-Sargent security agreement is
not an unlawful transfer. High Valley's motion to contest the exemption and the thirdparty claim of exemption is denied.

3. CONCLUSION
High Valley failed to establish that the Faler-Sargent security agreement is an
unlawful transfer. High Valley's motion to contest the exemption and the third-party
claim of exemption is denied.

Dated this

/D

day of July, 2008.

s
A

Brent J. Moss

District Judge

2morandum Decision
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision was served upon the following individuals via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on
this

JfL day of July, 2008, unless otherwise indicated:

Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
P.O. Box 50731
4 14 Schoup Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
John Ohrnan
P.O. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
William D. Faler
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Clerk of the Court
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CASE ASSIGNED TO
JUDGE GREGORY S. ANDERSON

William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
fjOLDEN, KIDWELL, EiAIfN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

- 11 8

~-CVO~

CARY SARGENT,

Case No. CV-06- ; :4'

tr

Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT
VS.

DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER,

Filing Category A-1
Filing Fee: $82.00

Defendants.

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff and for cause of action against the above
named Defendants alleges as follows:
1.

At all times herein mentioned Plaintiff, Cary Sargent, (hereafter "Sargent") was

and now is a resident of the State of Idaho.
2.

Defendant, Doyle Beck, (hereafter "Beck") is a resident of Bonneville County,

3.

Defendant, Mark Fuller, (hereafter "Fuller") is a resident of Bonneville County,

Idaho.

Idaho.

Complaint
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4.

In 1997, Sargent was approached by Beck regarding putting together a concrete

business with a batch plant and some concrete trucks Beck owned.
5.

Beck and Sargent decided in March 1997 to form a new concrete company with

the ownership to be divided 5 1 % for Beck and 49% for Sargent to be known as High Valley
Concrete, LLC.
6.

On March 24, 1997, Beck and Sargent had Fuller organize High Valley Concrete,

7.

A few days later on April 3, 1997, Sargent was asked to meet with Beck and

LLC.

Fuller, the attorney who was representing both Beck and Sargent.
8.

At the meeting with Beck and Fuller, Beck and Fuller recommended that instead

of issuing 49% of the Limited Liability Company units to Sargent, that all of the Limited
Liability Company units be placed in Beck's name because Beck could better utilize any tax
deductions in the early years of the business Beck and Fuller stated that if Sargent agreed to have
his units issued or transferred to Beck, the units would be transferred back to Sargent after a few
years.
9.

Sargent agreed and Fuller immediately pulled documents out of the desk for

Sargent to sign so that all units of ownershp were placed in Beck's name.
10.

By acting as described in paragraphs 2 through 9 of this Complaint, Beck and

Fuller assumed a fiduciary duty toward Sargent for Sargent's contributions to and interest in
High Valley Concrete, LLC.
11.

As a result of the representations and promises of Beck and Fuller:
a.

Sargent contributed to High Valley Concrete, LLC $26,065.00 from the
buyout of his interest in another business ownership.

Complaint
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b.

Sargent made other monetary contributions into High Valley Concrete,
LLC., and

c.

Sargent made other equipment and labor contributions into High Valley
Concrete, LLC.

12.

jv :.: 1 2

All of the contributions were made by Sargent on the b 3 o f ~ e c and
k Fuller

holding his interest for him.
13.

Thereafter, Sargent managed High Valley Concrete, LLC.

14.

On February 22,2002, Beck removed Sargent as the manager of High Valley

Concrete, LLC and since that date Beck has refused to allow Sargent access to the business, and
has refused to re-pay Sargent his contribution to the business.
15.

Beck and Fuller breached the fiduciary duty to Sargent by not protecting Sargent's

interest in High Valley Concrete, LLC, and not accounting to Sargent for his monetary and
property contributions to High Valley Concrete, LLC.
16.

As a result of the breach of the fiduciary duty by Beck and Mark Fuller, Sargent

has been damaged by the loss of his contributions to High Valley Concrete, LLC in an amount to
be proven at trial.
ATTORNEY FEES
That as a further and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, and each of them,
it has been necessary for plaintiffs to retain an attorney, William D. Faler of Holden, Kidwell,
Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., to initiate and prosecute this action; that pursuant to the provisions of
Idaho Code Section 12- 120(3) and 12- 121 and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is
entitled to recover their court costs and the sum of $2,500.00 for attorney fees in the event of a
default and for a greater sum to be determined by the Court in the event the matter is litigated.
Complaint
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WHEREI;ORE, Plaintiff prays the judgment, order and decree of this court against
Defendants (jointly and severally) as follows:
1.

For judgment against Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial.

2.

For attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and/or 12- 12I in the

amount of $2,500.00 in the event of default or such other sum as set by the Court in the event this
matter is litigated.
3.

For costs of suit incurred herein; and

4.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

22L!
day of February, 2006.

-

,'
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/ '

$(

' /u'L
f

'

~ i l l i a mD:FP&
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

Verification

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

Cary Sargent being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states:
That I am the Plaintiff in this matter, that I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint,
know the contents thereof and believe them to be true and correct to the best of my belief.

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this

(Seal)

2
7N' day of February, 2006.

~ b t a Public
r ~ for ldahoH
Residing at: Bye
,.
, YD
My Commission Expires: 9/3/7389

'-
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of not less than twelve ( 1 2) persons as to all
issues triable to a jury in this matter.
DATED THIS

zzJ2day of February, 2006.

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

(J
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William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18
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Attorneys for Defendant Cary Sargent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC., an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

I

I

II

COU~Q
of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:

Case No. CV-02-00484

SARGENT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT

Comes Now ~ e f e n d iCary
t
Sargent, and hereby moves the Court for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in the matter of High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent pursuant Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(c).
The basis for the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is insufficiency of
evidence to justify the return of a verdict against Defendant Sargent on the claim of fraud.
Dated this &';iay

of February, 2008.
William D. Faler
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailingor by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 2/'' day of February, 2008.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[
[
[
[

John M. Ohman
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter
P.O. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

[
[
[
[

U. S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
] Other

aU. S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
]Other

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
mail in^ Address:
P.0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0 130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18

I

9

DISTRICT SEVEN COURT
County of Fremont State of Idaho
Filed:

:

fE82la008

-

By:

-

Deputy Clerk

.-

-

.

-

-2

Attorneys for Defendant Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-02-00484

VS.

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM
D. FALER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Bonneville )

I

William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That the statements made herein are based upon personal knowledge unless

specifically stated otherwise.
2.

1served as counsel for Defendant Cary Sargent in the matter tried before the Court

from January 23 through February 1,2008.

3.

That during the trial, Defendant Sargent was severely limited by the number of

witnesses he could call as a result of the Court's limitation of Defendant Sargent's case to only one

ORIGINAL
Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial
and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
n--- rlnc

-..,

4.

I

enough time would be set aside to allow the parties to present their witnesses and evidence.
5.

I

That prior to the trial, then presiding Judge Brent Moss, specifically stated that

The Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, LLC, was allowed three and one-half days in

which to present its witnesses and its evidence.
6.

Defendant Sargent was allowed only one and one-half to present his witnesses and

his evidence and to respond to the evidence presented by High Valley Concrete, LLC and Doyle

I

Beck. As a result of such limitation Defendant Cary Sargent was denied the ability to present a
number of his witnesses, denied the ability to respond to each of the claims made by High Valley

I

I

Concrete, denied adequate time to rebut the testimony presented by High Valley Concrete, and
thus was denied the ability to obtain a fair trial.

I
I

7.

The evidence at trial does not support a verdict based on fraud in light of the jury's

findings as to Glendale. High Valley Concrete, LLC's Second Amended Complaint pleads a
fraudulent concealment count as follows:
"39. Specifically, Sargent had a duty to disclose that he was engaging in the
wrongful conduct as herein alleged.
40. Sargent breached his duty to disclose material facts to High Valley be failing to
disclose his wrongful conduct as alleged herein.
41. High Valley was justifiably induced to act in the business transaction by the
nondisclosure of material facts as herein alleged."
(Emphasis added).

8.

No evidence was presented at trial as to any business transaction that High Valley

was induced to enter into other than: a) the allegedly false leases of Glendale equipment, b) the
payments made by High Valley to Glendale shortly before Cary Sargent was forced out of High
Valley Concrete, c) the transferred of truck tires to Glendale in payment of what was owed to
2-

Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial and in Support of Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial
and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
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Glendale, and d) the repair of Glendale mixer trucks that were later used by Cary Sargent
personally.
9.

The jury specifically found that no civil conspiracy occurred between Cary Sargent

and Glendale, and that Glendale did not convert any assets of High Valley.
10.

Given the findings as to no civil conspiracy and no conversion in the dealings with

Glendale, it is legally impossible for fraud by Cary Sargent to have occurred in those transactions
as implicit in the jury's verdict is a finding that the conduct of Cary Sargent was not wrongful, ie:
that the leases were valid, the payments were valid, the transfer of the truck tires was valid, and the
repair of the Glendale trucks was valid.
11.

Additionally, no evidence was presented to show that the payment of a valid debt is

somehow unlawful, even if it was done instead of paying an owner of the company.
12.

Therefore, the Court should grant a new trial on the claims of conversion by Cary

Sargent, unjust enrichment of Cary Sargent, and breach of fiduciary duty.
13.

The Court should also grant Sargent's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict and dismiss the fraud count.
Dated this

of February, 2008.
/'

-.-----

William & ~ a l e r
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

2 rd day of February, 2008.

Residing at:
Commission Expires:
3-

.Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial and in Support of Motion for
anding the Verdict
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certif)r that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my ofice in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
of February, 2008.
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this 2/ -ZY
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for New Trial
and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
McGrath, Meacharn, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[
[
[
[

John M. Ohman
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

[
[
[
[

~ U. S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile

1 clther
U. S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
] Other

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
-
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Attorneys for Cary Sargent

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Plaintiff,
VS.
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. CV-07-118

SARGENT'S MOTION FOR
ADDITUR

CARY SARGENT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

DOYLE BECK,
Defendants.

Comes Now Plaintiff Cary Sargent, and hereby moves the Court for an Additur in the
matter of Cary Sargent v. Doyle Beck pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a), 59(e), and
59.1.
The basis for this motion for an Additur is that the jury having found that Doyle Back had a
fiduciary duty to Cary Sargent regarding Cary Sargent's interest in High Valley Concrete,LLC,

ORIGINAL
, Sargent's Motion for Additur

Page 300

should have awarded Cary Sargent the additional amounts Sargent proved that he had contributed
to High Valley Concrete, LLC, such amount being $37,746.12, and as more fully set forth in the
Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for Additur filed herein.

-

Dated this a s d a y of February, 2008.

V

William D. Faler
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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for Additur

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that 1 am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I sewed a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
day of February, 2008.
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Motion for Additur

ATTORNEYS SERVED:

fl U. S. Mail

Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
McGrath, Meacharn, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[
[
[
[

John M. Ohman
Cox Ohrnan & Brandstetter
P.O. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

[ F-] U. S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other

] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
]Other

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Rivewalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18
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Attorneys for Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O m T Y OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-07-118

VS.

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM
D. FALER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ADDITUR

-

CARY SARGENT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
DOYLE BECK,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:SS

County of Bonneville )
William D. Faler, first being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

ORIGINAL
,ffidavit of Wi!liam D. Faler in Support of Motion for Additur
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1.

That the statements made herein are based upon personal knowledge unless

specifically stated otherwise.

2.

I served as counsel for Cary Sargent in the matter tried before the Court from

January 23 through February 1,2008.
3.

The trial was conducted for the purpose of resolving two separate cases which had

previously been consolidated for trial as Fremont County Case No. CV-07-118, namely:

4.

a.

High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Cary Sargent and Glendale Construction,
Fremont County Case No. CV-02-484; and

b.

Cary Sargent v. Doyle Beck, Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-1046.

The jury determined that Doyle Beck owed Cary Sargent a duty to protect Cary

Sargent's interest in High Valley Concrete, LLC, after he arranged for Cary Sargent's ownership
interest in High Valley Concrete, LLC to be transferred to him (Doyle Beck) so that 100% of the
units of ownership were in Doyle Beck's name.
5.

After finding that a fiduciary duty was owed by Doyle Beck to Cary Sargent, the

jury found that Doyle Beck had breached such fiduciary duty.
6.

The jury then awarded damages for the breach of such fiduciary duty in the amount

of $28,896.88.

7.

A review of the items of damage sought by Cary Sargent for the breach of fiduciary

duty shows that a total of $79,571 .OO was sought by Cary Sargent.
8.

Eliminating the items of damage related to the exchange of vehicles and parts for

the repair services of Kirk Sargent in the amount of $6,928.00, and the undocumented cash spent
for parts, service, etc. of $6,000.00, leaves the sum of $66,643 as damages that were established by
the evidence.

-
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9.

Thus the Court should grant an additur of $37,746.12, increasing Sargent's damages

to $66,643.00.
Dated this &&day

./
of February, 2008.

-\------

William D. Faler

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

--

215f day of February, 2008.

Residing at:
Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that 1 served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailin3 or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this g ( ' day of February, 2008.
DOCUMENT SERVED:

Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for Additur

ATTORNEYS SERVED:

4 U. S. Mail

Bryan D. Smith
B.J. Driscoll
McGrath, Meacharn, Smith, P.L.L.C.
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[
[
[
[

John M. Ohman
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter
P.O. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

[ 3 U . S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other

] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
] Other

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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IN TI IIi DISTRICT COURT 01: TI 1E SEVEN'I'I I JUDICIAL, DISTRIC'T
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an Idaho
limited liability company,

FILED IN CHAMBERS
at Idaho Falls
Bonneville County

Plaintiff,

D,,

VS.

Time

CARY SARGENT,
Plaintiff,

%

Deputy clerk
Case No. CV-02-0484

CARY SARGENT, AND GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants.

3-37- 0 %
\;gGam

I

I

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Case No. CV-07-0 118

VS.

DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER,
Defendants.

I

On February 1,2008, the jury returned a verdict in case CV-02-0484 for High
Valley Concrete, L.L.C. ("High Valley") against Cary Sargent ("Sargent") on claims of
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment; and awarded High
Valley $48,98 1.16 in damages. The jury returned a verdict of no liability as to Glendale
Construction, Inc. ("Glendale"), but found that Glendale should return to High Valley an
LlO motor, a transfer case and a CAT 3306 motor. In case CV-07-0118, the jury
returned a verdict for Sargent against Doyle Beck ("Beck") on a claim of breach of
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fiduciary duty, and awarded Sargent $28,896.88. On February 6,2008, the Court entered
judgments on both verdicts.
On February 8,2008, in case CV-02-0484 Glendale filed an affidavit for
attorneys fees and costs signed by counsel John Ohman claiming $47,925.00 attorney
fees and $3,27 1.48 discretionary costs incurred through attorney Ohrnan, and claiming
$19,038.50 attorney fees, $742.35 costs of right, and $206.97 discretionary costs
incurred through former attorney William Faler. On February 20,2008, High Valley filed
an objection and motion to disallow Glendale's attorney fees and costs, supported by
affidavits of Bryan Smith, Doyle Beck and Clint Tavener and deposition excerpts. The
claim, objection and motion were orally argued on March 4, 2008.
On February 20,2008, in case CV-02-0484 Sargent filed a motion for JNOV
against the jury's verdict of liability on High Valley's fraud claim. In case CV-07-0118
Sargent filed under Rule 59 and 59. I, I.R.C.P. a motion seeking an additur of $37,746.12.
These motions were supported by the affidavit of counsel. Sargent also filed in both cases
a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(l), I.R.C.P., based on irregularity in the
proceeding for not having enough time to present Sargent's evidence, and a
memorandum of attorney fees and costs claiming in case CV-02-0484 $79,975.00
attorney fees, $1,762.9 1 costs of right, and $185.78 discretionary costs; and claiming in
case CV-07-0118 $5 1,989.50 attorney fees, $1,818.65 costs of right, and $1 85.78
discretionary costs. On March 3, 2008, High Valley and Beck filed a brief in opposition
to Sargent's motions, and an objection and motion to disallow fees and costs. The parties
stipulated that these motions could be decided without further oral argument upon the
record and additional briefs to be filed by March lothand 17'.
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Also on February 20,2008, in case CV-02-0484, High Valley filed a motion for
prejudgment interest on its $48,981.16 verdict and judgment, supported by the affidavit
of counsel. In Case CV-07-0118 Beck filed a motion for JNOV against the jury's verdict
of $28,896.88 based n not being supported by substantial evidence, supported by the
affidavit of counsel. Lastly, in case CV-02-0484 High Valley filed a memorandum of
fees and costs, affidavit of counsel, and a motion for award of fees and costs, claiming
against both Sargent and Glendale $1 07,955.00 attorney fees, $9,540.26 costs of right
and $3,341.91 discretionary costs. On March 10, 2008, Sargent filed a brief in opposition
to these claims and motions. On March 17,2008, High Valley filed a reply brief. The
parties stipulated that these motions could be decided without further oral argument upon
the record and additional briefs to be filed by March lothand 17" by the parties.
On March 10,2008, Sargent filed a post hearing brief opposing Beck's motion for
JNOV, and opposing High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest and request for
attorney fees. On March 17,2008, High Valley and Beck filed a post hearing brief in
response.
Having reviewed the pleadings, the Court's notes of the trial evidence, the jury's
verdicts, the parties' post trial motions, memoranda of fees and costs, affidavits, written
briefs, and oral argument, the Court issues the following memorandum decision on all
pending motions for JNOV, new trial, additur, and interest; and the Court hereby settles
the costs and attorney fees sought by the parties.

11. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rules 59(a), I.R.C.P., authorizes the trial court to grant any party a new trial on all
or part of the issues in an action on a showing of any one of seven specific grounds. The
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decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) generally rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Foundation, Inc.,
130 Idaho 400,405, 941 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1997); Rott v. Idaho State Building Authority,
128 Idaho 580,589,917 P.2d 737,746 (1996); O'Dell v. Basabe, 1 19 Idaho 796,8 13,
8 10 P.2d 1082,1099 (199 1); Quick v. Crane, 1 1 1 Idaho 759.766,727 P.2d 1 187, 1 194
(1986). The trial court must act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with any applicable legal standards, using an exercise of reason. State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1 989); Leavitt v. Swain, supra at 719,
963 P.2d at 1203. The trial court must distinguish between the various grounds upon
which a motion for new trial is based. Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 507, 817 P.2d
170, 173 (1991).
Rule 59(a)(l), I.R.C.P., authorizes a new trial for irregularity in the proceedings
of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by
which a party was deprived of a fair trial.
Rule 59(a)(6) authorizes a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to
justify the verdict or that it is against the law. In ruling on motion under this ground, the
trial court must weigh all the evidence, including the judge's own determination of the
credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the verdict is supported by the
evidence. Bott v. Idaho State Building Authority, 128 Idaho at 589, 917 P.2d at 746. In
order to grant a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must
determine both (1) the jury verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and (2) a
new trial would produce a different result. Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d
188, 193 (1990).
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Rule 59(a) expressly states that any motion made under subdivisions (1) (3) and
(4) must be accompanied by an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon, and a
motion under subdivisions (6) and (7) must set forth the factual grounds therefore with
particularity.
Where a jury award is based on substantial and competent evidence, but the
damage award is based on passion and prejudice and the amount is so disparately low to
what the trial judge would have awarded so as to shock the conscience of the trial judge,
under Rule 59(a), the trial 'ourt may grant an additur in damages as a condition to
denying a motion for new trial. Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 961 P.2d 647 (1998).
The decision is discretionary, and entails the trial judge's subjective evaluation of the
evidence and the judge's sense of fairness. Id.
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under Rule 50(b),
I.R.C.P., is simply a delayed motion for directed verdict that admits the truth of the non
moving party's evidence and reasonable inferences; and requires the trial court to
determine as a matter of law whether there was sufficient evidence for reasonable minds
to have reached the verdict. Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4,
936 P.2d 202 (Ct.App. 1997). The trial court is not free to weigh the evidence or pass on
the credulity of witnesses in making his own findings of fact, as would be the case in
ruling on a motion for new trial. Smith v. Praeaitzer, 1 13 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 1012
(Ct.App. 1988).
111. ANALYSIS
A.

SARGENT'S MOTION FOR JNOV ON FRAUD IN CV-02-484.
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Sargent argues in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to High
Valley's fraud count that because the jury found no civil conspiracy with Glendale and
found Glendale not liable for conversion or unjust enrichment, then there could be no
fraud finding against Sargent. In opposition High Valley argues that there was sufficient
competent evidence for the jury to find that Sargent committed fraud against High Valley
by taking a larger salary, paying for personal expenses, paying excessive money and
delivering equipment to Glendale without return consideration, and taking High Valley's
equipment without knowledge and approval by the limited liability company's members.
Although the facts were conflicting, there were substantial and competent facts
admitted into evidence for the jury to find as argued by High Valley. Therefore, the
motion must be denied.

B.

SARGENT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN BOTH CASES

Sargent7smotion for new trial in both cases argues under Rule 59(a)(l) that there
was an irregularity in the proceedings because Sargent did not have enough time to call
additional witnesses. In opposition, High Valley and Beck argue that Sargent waived this
ground for new trial by assuring the trial judge and other parties each day, until the last
day, that there was enough time to present his evidence.
Because Sargent has not presented any affidavit from any proposed witness who
was unable to testify, nor does Sargent7scounsel's affidavit delineate, any specific
material facts that were not submitted into evidence, this Court cannot find any prejudice
to Sargent resulting from the trial witness schedule. Further, this Court cannot determine
how a retrial would produce any different result.
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Sargent's motion for new trial in CV-02-484 also argues under Rule 59(a)(6) that
there was insufficient evidence to justify I-Iigh Valley's verdicts for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust enrichment. In opposition, High Valley argues that
Sargent has not supported his motion with the required factual particularity, and that
although the evidence was conflicting it was sufficient to support findings that Sargent
wrongfully took money and property of High Valley. This Court agrees with High
Valley's arguments, and concludes that substantial competent evidence was admitted to
support the jury's verdicts on those counts against Sargent as well as the amount of
compensatory damages.
Therefore, Sargent's motion for new trial must be denied.
C.

SARGENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITUR IN CV-07-118

Sargent's motion for additur under Rule 59.1 in case CV-07-118 argues that based
on his evidence of damages totaling $66,643 that the jury's verdict of $28,896.88 was
inadequate, and the Court should grant an additur of $37,746.12. In opposition, Beck
argues that an additur is proper only when the trial court would have granted more
damages based its own evaluation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses, and the
jury's verdict is so low that it "shocks the conscience of the court" after comparing the
two amounts.
The court specifically asked the parties at a hearing on March 4thto address how
the jury arrived at their damages verdict of $28, 896.88, and to explain what evidence the
jury had to determine the net worth of High Valley in February, 2002. Sargent's post
hearing brief provided little help to the Court, by stating that "it does not matter," because
the jury "could decide to award Sargent anywhere between $1 .OO to $79,000.00," and the
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jury "could make its award based upon either the contribution made by Cary Sargent or
the financial worth of the company at the time [February 22,20021 Beck removed
Sargent as the [LLC] manager."
It is important to note that the party seeking an additur has the burden to
demonstrate why his evidence was so compelling that the trial judge should find that
additional damages should be found and that the jury's verdict is shockingly low so as to
have been rendered on passion or prejudice.

See Collins v. Jones,

131 Idaho 556, 96 1

P.2d 647 (1998). This Court accepts the jury's verdict that Beck, as the owner of the
majority of limited liability company units, and as holder of Sargent's 49% interest,
breached his fiduciary duty owed to Sargent. However, in determining Sargent's
damages, the Court would need to find the net worth of High Valley in February, 2002.
Sargent's proof only suggested that High Valley made a 2001 profit of $75,000, and
Beck's evidence only suggested that High Valley's tax returns showed a loss for 2001,
and during the 5 years Sargent managed High Valley it lost $66 1,000.
To correctly decide Sargent's motion, the Court considers competent evidence of
the fair market value of all of High Valley assets and competent evidence of High
Valley's debts at a time close to February, 2002 in order to determine High Valley's net
worth. The arguments of the parties are of little help, because the parties focus only on
the profits and losses of High Valley. The Court's review of the evidence finds little
pertinent information to determine High Valley's net worth in February, 2002. The Court
also heard uncontroverted evidence that three creditors forced High Valley into
bankruptcy, but that High Valley came out of bankruptcy to pursue this action. The Court
concludes that High Valley had some net worth in February, 2002, but later was unable to
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pay bills to keep out of bankruptcy. Based on its own independent determination of the
credibility of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted, the Court would have found that
High Valley's net worth in February, 2002 was less than $50,000.00. The Court would
have found Sargent's damages, based on a loss of 49% of such net worth, was less than
$25,000.00. The jury's verdict does not shock the Court's conscience as being
unreasonably low.
Further, the Court observes that the jury awarded High Valley nearly $49,000.00
against Sargent for breaching his fiduciary duty as High Valley's manager. The jury may
have considered High Valley's damages as an asset, and added those damages into High
Valley's net worth as of February, 2002. In other words the jury may have determined
that Sargent had a 49% interest in the approximately $49,000 verdict, plus another $6,000
or $7,000 of assets over liabilities. Thus, the jury could have fashioned both verdicts so
that both Beck and Sargent bear responsibility for the failure of High Valley. That is a
reasonable approach, and the jury's finding in CV-07-118 does not shock the conscience
of this Court. Sargent's motion for additur must be denied.

D.

HIGH VALLEY'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN
CV-02-484

High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest argues under Idaho Code 28-22104(1) that the $48,981.16 in damages found by the jury against Sargent was liquidated
or readily ascertainable by mere mathematical process. In opposition, Sargent argues that
the damages were only arrived at by discretion and determining which valuation evidence
to believe.
Having listened to all the evidence at trial, and having looked at the exhibits, and
having listened to closing arguments rendered to the jury, this Court has no idea which
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items of money or property the jury found to have been wrongfully taken by Sargent in
order to calculate at its damages verdict. The evidence was conflicting as to what money
and property Sargent took from High Valley and why, and the values of such monies and
property was conflicting and much of it based on opinion evidence. It was a classic case
of unliquidated damages for which prejudgment interest has repeated been denied by
Idaho Courts.

See

Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d 1258

(2002); Bouten Const. Co. v. H.F. Mannuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,762,992 P.2d 75 1,
757 (1999); Farm Dev. Cow. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 91 8,920,478 P.2d 298,300
(1 970).

Therefore, the Court must deny High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest.

E.

BECK'S MOTION FOR JNOV IN CV-07-118

Beck's motion for JNOV in case CV-07-118 against Sargent's verdict for $28,
896.88 argues that 1) High Valley's operating agreement in sections 3.05 and 10.03
provide that a member may demand return of his capital contribution only from the
company's property, and has no recourse against any other member; 2) Sargent7sonly
remedy was to sue Beck in the name of High Valley; 3) Beck was not the manager of
High Valley so under Idaho Code 53-622(3) he owed no duty to Sargent; 4) if Beck
acted wrongfully as to High Valley, then under Idaho Code 53-659 only High Valley has
a cause of action against him; 5) if Beck acted wrongfully by not issuing 49% of the
units to Sargent, there were no damages caused because High Valley lost $661,000 over
its 5 years of operation; 5) Beck and Sargent were essentially partners and Sargent's
only remedy was to have the partnership wound up and an accounting completed; and 6)
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at best Sargent's only damages would be 49% of High Valley's profit, which was
negative, due to $661,000 in losses cumulative from 1997 to 2002.
In opposition, Sargent argues that his claim is based on the oral agreement with
Beck to hold Sargent's 49% interest for a few years so Beck could deduct 100% of
losses, and then return Sargent's 49% interest, so the operating agreement does not limit
his recovery. He further argues that High Valley made a profit of $75,000 in 2001, and
Beck caused Sargent to lose his share of the profit and his capital contribution.
As stated previously in this decision, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV) under Rule 50(b), I.R.C.P., is simply a delayed motion for directed
verdict that admits the truth of the non moving party's evidence and reasonable
T

inferences; and requires the trial court to determine as a matter of law whether there was
sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to have reached the verdict.
Initially, the Court concludes that Beck as the owner of the majority of limited
liability units of High Valley and as the holder of Sargent's units owed Sargent a
fiduciary duty. There was sufficient evidence, if the jury believed it, to find that Beck was
holding Sargent's 49% interest in High Valley for a few years so that Beck could take
100% of tax losses. There was sufficient evidence, if the jury believed it to find that
Beck excluded Sargent and wrongfully took his 49% when Sargent had contributed as
much capital as Beck. High Valley's operating agreement in paragraph 10.03 limits a
limited liability company member's recourse on dissolution to the remaining assets of the
company, and prohibits recourse against any other member for return of any net profit
and capital contribution. However, paragraph-1 0.03 does not specifically exclude a cause
of action from breach of fiduciary duty, and no case authority has been provided by Beck
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wherein any court has so held. On first impression, this Court holds that paragraph 10.03
does not, as a matter of law, exclude recovery against Beck for breach of fiduciary duty.
The jury could have found from the evidence that High Valley made a $75,000 profit in
2001. The jury could have found that in February, 2002 the company had a net worth,
and that Beck kept Sargent's 49% of the net worth. The jury could have determined that
the $49,000 verdict awarded to High Valley increased its net worth. While the Court
cannot itself determine the net worth of High Valley in February, 2002 from the
evidence, it also cannot hold as a matter of law that the jury could not have determined it.
The argument of the parties on this point has not convinced the Court to substitute its
judgment for the jury's verdict.
Therefore, Beck's motion for JNOV in case CV-07-118 must be denied.

F.

GLENDALE'S ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS IN CV-02-484

Following entry of a judgment on the verdict in CV-02-484, Glendale timely filed
an affidavit for attorney fees and costs signed by counsel John Ohman. Glendale claims
$47,925.00 attorney fees and $3,271.48 discretionary costs incurred through attorney
Ohrnan, and claims $1 9,038.50 attorney fees, $742.35 costs of right, and $206.97
discretionary costs incurred through former attorney William Faler.
High Valley objects and moved to disallow Glendale's request for attorney fees
and costs based on several arguments, including: 1) Glendale is not a prevailing party
because the jury verdict and judgment required Glendale to return some of High Valley's
property; 2) Faler did not represent Glendale before November, 2006; 3) Faler had a
conflict of interest preventing representation of Glendale; 4) Faler's charges were not
necessary when Ohman represented Glendale; 5) no separate affidavit was signed by
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Faler as required by Rule 54(e)(5) attesting to the basis of computing his fees; 6)
Ohrnan's invoices do not show the amount of time per task performed; 7) $9,856.50 of
Ohman's charges are unreasonable; 8) $571.21 of Ohman's deposition costs were not
paid to a court reporter; 9) Ohrnan's discretionary costs were not necessary or
exceptional; and 10) some of Glendale attorney fees should be reduced based n equitable
considerations.
Rule 54, I.R.C.P., entitles a prevailing party in a civil action to certain costs, and
where permitted by statute a reasonable attorney fee. In determining the prevailing party,
the trial court must utilize its discretion and consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC
v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005). Although, High
Valley argues that Glendale was not the prevailing party because the jury verdict and
judgment stated Glendale should return an L10 motor, a transfer case and a CAT 3306
motor, the Court disagrees. High Valley's amended complaint against Glendale sought
only damages for conspiracy to commit fraud, conversion and unjust enrichment. In
closing argument High Valley requested the jury to award several thousand dollars in
both compensatory and punitive damages. Counsel did not request return of any property.
The jury's verdict stating property should be returned was merely gratuitous. The Court
judgment parroting the jury's suggestion was also gratuitous. High Valley did not seek to
amend its complaint to seek specific performance. None of the relief sought by High
Valley was awarded. Glendale was the overall prevailing party and is entitled to costs
and attorney fees provided by statute.
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Although Idaho Code 12-121 was cited by Glendale as a basis for award of
attorney fees, Glendale does not seriously argue that the case was pursued frivolously or
without basis in law or fact, and the Court finds that this statute does not apply to this
case. The parties all argued in briefs and orally that the transaction between High Valley
and Glendale was a commercial transaction and that Idaho Code 12-120(3) applies to the
claims in this case. This is essentially a stipulation to apply Idaho Code 12-120(3), and
therefore, the Court so finds that Glendale is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee under
Idaho Code 12-120(3) and Rule 54(e), I.R.C.P.
The $19,038.50 of attorney fees presumably incurred by Mr. Faler for Glendale as
set out in Exhibit B to Mr. Ohrnan's affidavit cannot be awarded to Glendale. First, Rule
54(e)(5), I.R.C.P., requires that "the claim for attorney fees as costs shall be supported by
an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney
fees claimed." (Bold emphasis added) This affidavit must contain enough information
for the trial court to apply the factors in Rule 54(e)(3). Mr. Ohman's affidavit is far short
for this purpose, since he has little idea what Mr. Faler was doing during the time periods
for which the $19,000 is sought. Mr. Faler did not file an affidavit to support Glendale's
claim, although he did file an affidavit to support Sargent's claim. The Court has
examined Faler's affidavit filed for Sargent, and it is not sufficient to cover the $19,000
claimed by Glendale. The Court need not consider High Valley's other arguments,
however, the Court agrees that Faler cannot charge Glendale for work after December
28,2006, when Judge Moss disqualified Faler from representing Glendale.
The Court has examined Mr. Ohrnan's charges for legal services rendered for
Glendale from Exhibit A to his affidavit along with the specific objections argued in High
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Valley's brief. The Court agrees that Ohman cannot charge $2,520 for trial on Saturday
February 2,2008, when the jury verdict came in at 7:00 p.m. on Friday, February 1,
2008. The Court finds that Ohman's other charges are reasonable, including the use of a
paralegal at trial to help keep track of the numerous exhibits of all parties. Therefore,
Glendale is awarded a reasonable attorney fee of $45,405.00.
A11 of Glendale's discretionary costs of $3,271.48 set out in Ohrnan7saffidavit,
including faxes, long distance telephone, photocopies, postage, travel and lodging were
ordinary litigation expenses, not exceptional expenses. Using the Court's discretionary
such discretionary costs are disallowed. The costs claimed in Exhibit B to Ohman's
affidavit are either non-exceptional discretionary costs, or not incurred for Glendale. The
costs for copies of depositions defended by Mr. Faler in April and June, 2006 appear to
be incurred for Sargent. Glendale was not a party to the litigation until an amended
complaint was filed and served in November, 2006. However, Ohman's affidavit is
sufficient under Rule 54(d), I.R.C.P., to establish that filing fees of $87.00 were paid to
the clerk on behalf of Glendale. Therefore, Glendale is awarded $87.00 costs of right.

G.

HIGH VALLEY'S ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS IN CV-02-484

Following entry of a judgment on the verdict in CV-02-484, High Valley timely
filed an affidavit for attorney fees and costs signed by counsel Bryan Smith. High Valley
claims $ 74,071.62. attorney fees, and $ 12,882.17 costs.
Sargent objects to High Valley's request for attorney fees and costs based on
several arguments, including: 1) High Valley was not the prevailing party because the
jury awarded only $49,000 when High Valley argued for $661,000; and 2) Beck did not
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prevail in CV-07-118 and High Valley has not segregated out fees and costs incurred for
Beck's defense of that action.
Rule 54, I.R.C.P., entitles a prevailing party in a civil action to certain costs, and
where permitted by statute a reasonable attorney fee. In determining the prevailing party,
the trial court must utilize its discretion and consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC
v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 ldaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005). In this case all
parties argue that Idaho Code 12-120(3) applies as the gravamen of the action was a
commercial transaction.
Although, the jury verdict was only approximately $49,000, the Court concludes
that such amount is substantial when compared to High Valley's closing argument
request of $332,000. Therefore High Valley was the prevailing party as against Sargent.
High Valley has excluded from its request all attorney fees incurred to pursue claims
against Glendale. It has not excluded attorney fees incurred for Beck. Because the facts of
the two lawsuits are intermingled only a small amount of additional legal work was
needed to respond to Sargent's claims against Beck in CV-07-118, i. e., preparing an
answer, responding to discovery in that action, a few minutes additional time in Beck's
and Sargent's depositions; and one additional day of trial time for additional direct, cross
and redirect examination and dealing with about 50 extra exhibits. Thus, the Court
reduces High Valley's attorney fees approximately 10% or $7,400. Therefore, High
Valley is awarded $ 66,671.62 as a reasonable attorney fee.
The Court concludes that some of High Valley's costs were incurred in CV-071 18, including $66.00 for filing fees and $400 of the cost of volumes I11 and IV of Cary
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Sargent's deposition. The Court concludes that some of High Valley's costs in CV-02484 were incurred to pursue Glendale, including service fees for depositions for Glendale
of $30, Kim Allen, Joan and Gil Sluder of $120, service of amended complaint on
Glendale of $ 60, writ of execution on Glendale's Bank of $60, trial subpoena on Kim
Allen of $60, depositions costs for Glendale of $ 109, Gene Sluder of $98, Gib Sluder of
$ 59.50, Joan Sluder of $105.27, and Kim Allen of $275.30. The Court concludes that

some of High Valley's costs were not exceptional discretionary costs, including Zip
Print copies of $20.99, $27.99, $423.49 and $202.72; binders $ 143.18 and $96.70;
projector rental $96.09; photograph sheets $21.57 and photocopies $2,732.85. These
costs totaling $ 5,208.65 are disallowed. High Valley is awarded $ 7,773.52 costs of
right against Sargent.

H.

SARGENT'S ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS IN CV-07-118

Following entry of a judgment on the verdict in CV-07-118, Sargent timely filed
an affidavit for attorney fees and costs signed by counsel William Faler. Sargent claims
$ 5 1,989.50 attorney fees, $ 1,818.65 costs of right, and $ 185.78 discretionary costs.

Beck objects and moved to disallow Sargent's request for attorney fees and costs
based on several arguments, including: 1) Sargent is not the prevailing party because his
$28,896.88 verdict is offset by High Valley's $48,98 1.16 verdict, resulting in an
"overall" net loss of $20,084.28; 2) $1 9,020.77 of Sargent's claimed attorney fees were
incurred between July 22,2002 and February, 2006, whereas Sargent's complaint was
not filed until February 22,2006; 3) Sargent's counsel did not "certify" under Rule
54(d)(5) that the fees are "correct"; 4) Sargent did not provide the hourly rate which
appears to average $190 per hour; 5) Sargent is claiming $ 5,13 1.95 from November 20
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through December 14,2006, and $248.01 on March 30,2006, for time spent on behalf of
Glendale; 6) Sargent's fees were unreasonable as to the amount of time spent doing
certain tasks or doing work a paralegal might do; 7) Sargent's "unidentified court costs"
and discretionary costs for photocopies and travel; and 8) Sargent's request for attorney
fees is "inequitable, unfair and dishonest."
Rule 54, I.R.C.P., entitles a prevailing party in a civil action to certain costs, and
where permitted by statute a reasonable attorney fee. Jn determining the prevailing party,
the trial court must utilize its discretion and consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC
v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005). In this case all
parties argue that Idaho Code 12-120(3) applies as the gravamen of the action was a
commercial transaction. While Sargent's memorandum of attorney fees and costs also
refers to Idaho Code 12-121, this Court concludes that the defense by Beck was not
frivolous and that section does not apply.
Sargent's action in CV-07-118 was against Beck, not High Valley, and the jury
returned a verdict of nearly $29,000 based on breach of fiduciary duty. Although in
closing argument Sargent requested over $79,000, under the reasoning of Eighteen Mile
Ranch the nearly $29,000 verdict is a substantial recovery in CV-07-118. While Sargent
lost in CV-02-484 and many of the facts and claims were similar, nevertheless CV-071I8 was a separate action against a different party. Thus, Sargent was the prevailing party
and is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee under Idaho Code 12-120(3). In a case of first
impression, this court rejects Beck's argument that equitable principles should be used to
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disallow attorney fees to Sargent because ldaho Code 12- 120(3) is a mandatory statutory
remedy where the courts have no discretion except as to the amount.
The Court concludes that $1 9,020.77 of Sargent's attorney fees incurred between
July 22,2002 and February 22,2006 are not recoverable in CV-07-118, but it appears
that Sargent's counsel is not claiming those fees in CV-02-484. Mr. Faler's affidavit is
adequate to substantially comply with rule 54(d)(5) and detailed enough for the Court to
apply the factors in Rule 54(e)(3) to determine a reasonable attorney fee. Comparing the
billings attached to the Ohrnan affidavit with those attached to the Faler affidavit, the
Court concludes that no Glendale attorney fees are claimed as part of CV-07-118.
Having considered the factors in rule 54(e)(3) ,the billing's attached to Faler's affidavit,
Beck's objections, and the Court's knowledge of the court files, facts and legal theories
presented, the Court concludes that $51,989.50 is a reasonable attorney fee for Sargent
in CV-07-118.
Sargent is awarded $ 82.00 for filing fee, $25.00 for service fee, $1,226.75 for
deposition transcript, for Total costs of right of $1,333.75. Discretionary costs claimed
for photocopies and travel were not exceptional and are disallowed.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that
1.

Sargent's motion for JNOV on fraud claim in CV-2-484 is DENIED;

2.

Sargent's motion for new trial in both cases is DENIED;

3.

Sargent's motion for additur in CV-07-118 is DENIED;

4.

High Valley's motion for prejudgment interest in CV-02-484 is DENIED;

5.

Beck's motion for JNOV in CV-07-118 is DENIED;
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6.

Glendale is awarded $ 45,405.00 attorney fees and $ 87.00 costs of right in
CV-02-484 against High Valley;

7.

High Valley is awarded $ 66,671.62 attorney fees and $ 7,673.52 costs of
right in CV-02-484 against Sargent;

8.

Sargent is awarded $ 51, 989.50 attorney fees and $ 1,333.75 costs of right in
CV-07-118 against Beck.

DATED this@ay

of March, 2008.

'

RICHARD T. ST. CLAIR
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

st

day of March, 2008,I did send a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on this
the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Bryan D. Smith
P. 0. Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
William D. Faler
P. 0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
John M. Ohrnan
P. 0. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
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Bryan D. Smith, Ilsq. - ISB No. 441 1
B. J. Driscoll, 1Jsq. - ISB No. 70 1 0
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. 0. Box 5073 1
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166
Attorneys for Plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.,
And Defendant, Doyle Beck.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THZ SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AN{) FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an
Idaho limited liability company,
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Case No. CV-02-0484
Case No. CV-07-0118

VS.
CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
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DOCUMENT
bC,4tiM'"L-;

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, CARY SARGENT
AND HIS ATTORNEY, WILLIAM D. FALER, ESQ., of the firm HOLDEN,
KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.; GLENDALE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
AN IDAHO CORPORATION AND ITS ATTORNEY, JOHN M. OHMAN, ESQ.,
of the firm COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTEREDAND TO THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named defendant, Doyle Beck, appeals to the Idaho Supreme

Court from the District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended
Judgment entered March 3 1, 2008 in the above-entitled action against defendant, Doyle
Beck, and in favor of plaintiff, Cary Sargent, Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District
Judge, presiding.
2.

The above-named plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited

liability company, appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's
Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended Judgment entered March 3 1,2008 in
the above-entitled action against defendant, Cary Sargent, and in favor of plaintiff, High
Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited iiability company, Honorable Richard T. St.
Clair, District Judge, presiding.

3.

Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC have the right to appeal to the Idaho

Supreme Court, and the judgments described in paragraphs one and two above are subject
to appeal pursuant to Rule 1 I (a), Idaho Appellate Rules.
4.

The issues which Beck intends to assert on appeal are the following:
a.

Is the jury's award of $28,896.88 supported by substantial evidence?

b.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it determined that

substantial evidence supports the jury's award of $28,896.88?
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5.

The issue which High Valley Concrete, LLC intends to assert on appeal is

the following:
a.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied High

Valley's motion for prejudgment interest?

6.

There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this

5.

Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request that the reporter prepare the

case.

transcripts of the trial dated January 24,2008 through February 1,2008. Beck and High
Valley, LLC request that the reporter not prepare the opening statements of counsel. Beck
and High Valley LLC further request that the reporter not prepare any of the closing
arguments of Bryan D. Smith or John M. Ohrnan. Beck and High Valley, LLC do request
that the reporter prepare the closing argument of William D. Faler.

6.

Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request the following documents be

included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
Idaho Appellate Rules:
a.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion for Award of Prejudgment

Interest dated February 20,2008;
b.

The Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated February 20,2008;

c.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Brief in Support of Award of

Prejudgment Interest dated February 20,2008;
d.

Beck's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated

February 20,2008;
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e.

Heck's Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict dated February 20,2008;
f.

Affidavit of Attorney William D. Faler in Support of Motion for

Additur dated February 2 I , 2008;
g-

Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Post-Judgment Motions dated

March 10,2008; and
h.

7.

Memorandum decision and order dated March 26,2008.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

That the reporter who reported the trial before the district court has

been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcripts;
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

paid;

pursuant to Rule 20, Igaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this %
'?ya

of May, 2008.
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES,
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CERTIFICATE OR SJCRVICE

74%

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2008 1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by placing the same
in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by
hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
[ 6 s . Mail
[ -simile
Transmission
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box
[
[
[
[
[

] U.S. Mail
] Facsimile Transmission
] Overnight Delivery

William D. Faler, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

] Courthouse Mail Box

John M. Ohman, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD
P.O. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[ -Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

Debbie Mace
Clerk of the District Court
Fremont County Courthouse
151 West 1 North, Room 12
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445

[
[
[
[
[

T&T Reporting
Certified Court Reporters
P. 0 . Box 5 1020
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] U.S. Mail
] Facsimile Transmission
] Overnight Delivery
find Delivery
] Courthouse Mail Box

William D. Faler, Esq.
Idaho State Bar No. 1464
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Mailing Address:
P. 0 . Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-95 18

--__I

By:

_

ABBIE u/',CV$fiii(
.

--

. : ;I.
-.LdLl-i.

Attorneys for Appellant Cary Sargent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF F E M O N T
HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C.,
an Idaho Limited Liability Company
PlaintifE/Respondent,
VS

.

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
DefendantIAppellant.

NOTICE O F APPEAL

Case No. CV-02-00484
Case No. CV-07-00 118

CARY SARGENT,
PlaintifUAppellant,
vs.

DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER,
DefendantsRespondent .

TO:
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High Valley Concrete, L.L.C., Doyle Beck, and their attorneys of record, Bryan D.
Smith and B.J. Driscoll of the law firm McGrath, Meacham, Smith, P.L.L.C.;
Glendale Construction, Inc, and its attorney of record, John M. Ohman of the law
firm Cox, Ohman and Brandstetter; and the Clerk of the Seventh Judicial District
Fremont County:

-

ORIGINAL

1.

NOTICE:
The above named Appellant, Cary Sargent, by and through his attorney of record,

William D. Faler, of the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Halhn & Crapo, P.E.L.C., appeals fiom the
District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008, the Amended Judgment entered March 31,
2008, and the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered March 27,2008, all in Fremont
County Case No. CV-02-484, the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair presiding, against the abovenamed Respondent High Valley Concrete, LLC, to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The above named Appellant, Cary Sargent, by and through his attorney of record,
William D. Faler, of the law firm Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.E.L.C., appeals fiom the
District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008, the Amended Judgment entered March 3 1,
2008, and the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered March 27,2008, all in Fremont
County Case No. CV-07-118, the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair presiding, against the abovenamed Respondent Doyle Beck, to the Idaho Supreme Court.

2.

RIGHT OF APPEAL:
The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order previously

described is an appealable decision under and pursuant to Rule 1 1(a)(5) and Rule 11(a)(6), I.A.R.

3.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL:
1.

High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Cary Sargent - Fremont County Case No. CV-02484:
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a.

Was there sufficient evidence to support a verdict on the fraud count?

b.

Is the jury's award sf $48,98 1.16 supported by substantial evidence?

c.

Did the District Court commit reversible error when it determined that

substantial evidence supports the jury's award of $48,981.16?
d.

Did the District Court commit reversible error when it failed to grant Cary
Sargent's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict?

2.

Cary Sargent v. Doyle Beck - Fremont County Case No. CV-07-118:
a.

Did the District Court commit reversible error when it failed to grant an
additur?

b.

Did the District Court error when it awarded Plaintiff Sargent only
$28,896.88 of the requested $79,571.00.

4.

STATUS OF THE RECORD:
The Appellant nor his attorney of record have any knowledge of any portion of the record

being sealed in this matter.
5.

REQUEST FOR REPORTER9STRANSCNPT
A reporter's transcript of the trial is requested.

6.

WEQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 28,1.A.R:
1.

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in Fremont County Case No.
CV-02-484;

2.

Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict in Fremont County Case No. CV-02-484.

3.

Motion for Additur in Fremont County Case No. CV-07-118;

4.

Affidavit of William D. Faler in Support of Motion for Additur in Fremont
County Case No. CV-07-118; and

5.
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Memorandum Decision and Order filed March 27,2008, in both Fremont County

Cases CV-02-484 and CV-07-1118.
7.

CERTIFICATION:
William D. Faler, certifies that:
1.

A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on Debby Mace, Fremont County
Court Clerk.

2.

A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on T&T Reporting, Certified
Court Reporters.

3.

The estimated fee for the additional transcript requested by Appellant has been
paid.

4.

The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record of $200.00 has been
paid to the Fremont County District Court Clerk.

5.

The filing fee of $15.00 has been paid to the Fremont County District Court Clerk.

6.

The filing fee of $86.00 for the Supreme Court has been provided to the Fremont
County District Court to be forwarded with the certified copy of this Notice of
Appeal to the Supreme Court.

7.

Service has been made upon all parties as required pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.
,
Dated this C $ a y of ~ a y2008.

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
Attorney for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the
correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on this

DOCUMENT SERVED:

f d' ay

of May, 2008.

Notice of Appeal - Cary Sargent

ATTORNEYS SERVED:

John M. Ohman
Cox Ohman & Brandstetter
P.O. Box 51600
[ Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

[

] Hand Delivery

[

] Hand Delivery

I[

]Other

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
G \WPDATA\WDR_Client Files R-S\Sargent lO82AWord ProcessingMppealWoticc ofAppeal.@
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 441 1
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 701 0
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. 0. Box 5073 1
4 14 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1
Telefax: (208) 529-4 1 66

'"
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Attorneys for Appellants, High Valley Concrete, L.L.C.,
And Doyle Beck.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, L.L.C., an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CV-02-0484
Case No. CV-07-0118

VS.

CARY SARGENT, and GLENDALE
CONSTRUCTION, N C . , an Idaho
corporation,

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendants.
CONSOLIDATED WITH
CARY SARGENT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

DOYLE BECK and MARK FULLER,
Defendants.

Amended Notice of Appeal
Page 337

1

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, CARY SARGENT
AND HIS ATTORNEY, WILLIAM D. FALER, ESQ., of the firm HOLDEN,
IUDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.; GLENDALE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
AN IDAHO CORPORATION AND ITS ATTORNEY, JOHN M. OHMAN, ESQ.,
of the firm COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTEREDAND TO THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named defendant, Doyle Beck, appeals to the Idaho Supreme

Court from the District Court's Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended
Judgment entered March 3 1,2008 in the above-entitled action against defendant, Doyle
Beck, and in favor of plaintiff, Cary Sargent, Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District
Judge, presiding.
2.

The above-named plaintiff, High Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited

liability company, appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's
Judgment entered February 7,2008 and Amended Judgment entered March 3 1,2008 in
the above-entitled action against defendant, Cary Sargent, and in favor of plaintiff, High
Valley Concrete, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Honorable Richard T. St.
Clair, District Judge, presiding, and from the District Court's Memorandum Decision
entered July 14,2008 denying High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion to Contest Claim of
Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption, Honorable Brent J. Moss, presiding.
3.

Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC have the right to appeal to the Idaho

Supreme Court, and the judgments and decision described in paragraphs one and two
above are subject to appeal pursuant to Rule 11(a), Idaho Appellate Rules.
4.

The issues which Beck intends to assert on appeal are the following:
a.
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Is the jury's award of $28,896.88 supported by substantial evidence?

b.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it determined that

substantial evidence supports the jury's award of $28,896.88?
5.

The issues which High Valley Concrete, LLC intends to assert on appeal are

the following:
a.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied High

Valley's motion for prejudgment interest?
b.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied High

Valley's motion to contest claim of exemption and third-party claim of exemption?
6.

There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this

5.

Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request that the reporter prepare the

case.

transcripts of the trial dated January 24,2008 through February 1,2008. Beck and High
Valley, LLC request that the reporter not prepare the opening statements of counsel. Beck
and High Valley LLC further request that the reporter not prepare any of the closing
arguments of Bryan D. Smith or John M. Ohman. Beck and High Valley, LLC do request
that the reporter prepare the closing argument of William D. Faler.

6.

Beck and High Valley Concrete, LLC request the following documents be

included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
Idaho Appellate Rules:
a.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion for Award of Prejudgment

Interest dated February 20'20G8;
b.
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The Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated February 20,2008;

c.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Brief in Support of Award of

Prejudgment Interest dated February 20,2008;
d.

Beck's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated

February 20,2008;
e.

Beck's Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict dated February 20,2008;
f.

Affidavit of Attorney William D. Faler in Support of Motion for

Additur dated February 2 1,2008;
g.

Sargent's Memorandum Regarding Post-Judgment Motions dated

March 10,2008;
h.

Memorandum decision and order dated March 26,2008;

1.

Third Party Claim of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

dated April 10,2008, together with the Security Agreement attached thereto and
marked as Exhibit A;
j-

Claim of Exemption from Cary Sargent dated April 10,2008;

k.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Motion to Contest Claim of

Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption dated April 18,2008, together with
Exhibits "A" and "B" attached thereto;
1.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Brief in Support of Motion to Contest

Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption dated April 18,2008;
m.

Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated April 18,2008, together with

Exhibits "A" and " B attached thereto;
n.
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Affidavit of William D. Faler dated April 29,2008;

o.

Affidavit of Cary Sargent dated April 29,2008;

p.

Notice dated April 30,2008, signed by the Honorable Brent J. Moss;

q.

Supplemental Affidavit of William D. Faler dated May 14, 2008;

r.

Sargent7sMemorandum Regarding Security Agreement dated May

14,2008;
s.

High Valley Concrete, LLC's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to

Contest Claim of Exemption and Third-Party Claim of Exemption dated May 20,
2008; and
t.

Memorandum Decision dated July 10,2008, signed by the

Honorable Brent J. Moss.
7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of amended appeal has not been served on

the reporter because defendant does not request any further record be transcribed;
(b)

That the appellate filing fee has already been paid; and

(c)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule
DATED this

6

day of July, 2008.
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF Sl$RVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the z e 0 f July, 2008 1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to
the following:
[
[
[
[
[

4433. Mail
] Facsimile Transmission
] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery
] Courthouse Mail Box

[m.

William D. Faler, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, PLLC
P.O. Box 50 130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ 1 Courthouse Mail Box

John M. Ohrnan, Esq.
COX, OHMAN &
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD
P.O. Box 5 1600
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[+WS.
Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

Debbie Mace
Clerk of the District Court
Fremont County Courthouse
151 West 1" North, Room 12
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
) Supreme Court No. 35312135313
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), )
) Case No. CV2002-484
VS
)
CV2007-118
)
Doyle Beck
) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). )

Cary Sargent

Mark Fuller

1
)
Defendant )

)
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho
)
Limited liability company
1
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), )
v.

1
)

Cary Sargent and Glendale
Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corp
)
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). )
I, Becky Harrigfeid, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as
indicated:
DESCRIPTION
Missing Cash and Trades
Parts and Service on Personal Vehicles lnvoices
lnvoices
Photography lnvoices
High Valley Concrete Vendor QuickReport
Dated 4/2/2002
Grocery lnvoices
Miscellaneous lnvoices
Vehicle Payment Checks
Check to Lynn Gneiting
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SENTIRETAINED
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Dated 1 112712001
1997 - 2002 Fuel Expenditures
Summary of High Valley Wages Overpayment to Cary Sargent
Cary Sargent Partner One - Copies of cancelled checks
Cancelled checks Cary Sargent Wrote to himself from High Valley
Lease Agreement
Date 311011 998
Lease Agreement
Dated 311 011998
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc.
Dated 21612002
Vendor Payout Spreadsheet
Dated 5171200 1 - 212012002
Vendor Payout Spreadsheet
Time Cards
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc.
Dated 211 812002
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc.
Dated 211 112002
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction, Inc.
Dated 91911 998
Glendale Construction Invoice
Dated 611 911 998
Articles of Organization - High Valley Concrete
Dated 212212002
Articles of Incorporation - High Valley Concrete
Dated 31611 998
Glendale Construction, Inc. Letter to Carey Sargent
Dated 412012004
Fuller & Carr Letter to Carey Sargent
Dated 111911 999
Timecards for work on Carey Sargent's Vehicles
Trustee's Assignment
Dated 91112005
Shipping Lists from Western States CAT
Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, Kam, & Moeller Letter
Dated 312711998
Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers lnvoice
Dated 61512001
Glendale Construction Statement
Dated 612911999
Glendale Construction Invoice
Dated 1/6/1999
High Valley Payments that Funded Kickin Koncrete
Cancelled check - Glendale Redi-Mix
Dated 11711999
Articles of Organization for High Valley Concrete
Certificates of Exhibits
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Dated 3/24/97
Ownership Certificate(Sargent)
Dated 413107
Schedule A to Operating Agreement
Dated 4/2/97
Ownership Certificate (Beck)
Dated 413197
Schedule A to Operating Agreement
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers of High Valley
Dated 4/3/97 10:OO am
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers of High Valley
Dated 4/3/97 10:30 am
Stock Certificate - 100 Units to Doyle Beck
Dated 4/3/97
Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Members of High Valley
Dated 2122102
Operating Agreement
Dated 412197
Letter from Wells Fargo
Dated 1012101
Check (Voided) to Beco for $50,000.00
Dated 11127101
Copy of Accounting - Beco Construction
Dated 11127101
Copy of Promissory Note for $125,000.00
Dated 8/27/00
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 5124199
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 3126199
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 1/25/99
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 11128198
Copy of checks 1067, 1068 & 1069
Dated 2/5/99
Wells Fargo memo to Doyle Beck
Dated 12118101
Copy of checks 5147 & 5148
Dated 1013101
High Valley Concrete Profit and Loss - 111197 - I2130197
Dated I2130197
Screener Lists 1999 to 2001 [Employee Hours]
First Security Leasing Agreement - Doyle Beck
Date 1129100
First Security Promissory Note - Doyle Beck
Dated 8/27/00
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

First Security Master Equipment Loan & Security Agreement
Dated 717199
First Security Promissory Note and Guarantee
Dated 6129199
Purchase Order
Dated 413197
High Valley Concrete Profit and Loss - 9199 through 10199
Dated 11199
Copy of check 1264 - First Consumers National Bank
Dated 2118102
Copy of checks 5039,5040, & 5046
Dated 12118101 & 12120101
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss -January 2000
Dated 1111102
Copy of checks 1043,1041,1045,1047
Dated 12119197 & 6/27/99
Copy of Check 5066
Dated 118102
Release of claim - unsigned and not dated
Handy Truck Line Quote
Dated 5/28/99
First Security Bank - Due Notice
Dated 1014100
Reconciliation Report
Dated 2112/02
KeyBank Banking Statement
Dated 4130197
Copy of checks 4176 & 279
Dated 11120100
Copy of check 4926
Dated 11127101
State Insurance Fund - RenewallAudit Payroll Report
Dated 3125199
Time Cards
Dated 8131101 - 1118102
Load Reports
Dated 8131101 - 11126101
Hours of Repair on Screener by Employees
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 1125199
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 1I25199
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 5124199
First Security Bank Modification Agreement
Dated 5/24/99
Copy of checks to High Valley Concrete
Certificates of Exhibits
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Dated 511197 & 4125197
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs by Heath Wood
Time Card - Heath Wood
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Britt Briggs
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Damon Challis
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Stacey Shaw
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Don Park
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Travis Froehlich
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Scott Allen
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs - Edgar Barney
Time Card - Paul Gallup
Time Card - Gregg Whitmore
High Valley lnvoice - BECO
High Valley lnvoice - Roker Materials
High Valley lnvoice - BECO
CAT Loader - Parts & Repairs
April Spreadsheet - Sales
May 2001 - December 2001 Sales
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
Dated 1111102
Check Register Spreadsheet
Dated 51911997 - 211812002
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
Dated 2/1/02
Copies of Cary Sargent Checks & Invoices
Odometer Disclosure Statement
Dated 7123101
Odometer Disclosure Statement
Dated 7123101
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 1999 Cary W. Sargent
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2000 Cary W. Sargent
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2001 Cary W. Sargent
Flyer from Robert Taylor & Sons
Dated 1211212000
lnvoice from Erickson Pontiac
Dated 121611995
Notice of Application Dismissal
Dated 611512001
Cancelled Checks - Farm Bureau Insurance
Dated 1998 - 2000
Cancelled Check - BECO
Dated 71711999
Letter from Laura E. Lowery
Dated 311312003
Cancelled Checks - Cary Sargent to High Valley
Dated 412511997 & 51111997
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Holnam paper with notes
Letter from Harper-Leavitt Engineering, Inc.
Dated 612211998
Cancelled check - Valley Auto
Dated 311611998
High Valley Concrete Account QuickReport
Dated 1213111998
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 1213111998
Cancelled checks
Dated 512211999, 61911999, 81511999, 1012712000
Employer Quarterly Unemployment Insurance Tax Report
Dated 412811999
Cancelled check - Glendale Construction
Dated 511911999
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 1213011999
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2000 Cary W. Sargent
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2000 Kim Sargent
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 1213112000
W-2 Wage and Tax Statement - 2001 Kirk D. Sargent
High Valley Concrete Transaction Detail by Account
Dated March & June 2001
High Valley Concrete AIP Aging Summary
Dated 111012002
Handwritten monthly calculations
Dated 111999 - 611999
Load Reports
Dated 91112001 - 112512002
Load Reports
Dated 91112001 - 112512002
Handwritten Notes
Stolen Property Partial List
Cancelled check - Capital One Services
Dated 101611999
Cancelled check - Cary Sargent
Dated 912911999
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging QuickZoom
Dated 212112002
Fax from BECO
Dated 112512002
Invoices from Rays Chevron
Dated 512612001
Handwritten Note
Ownership Certificate for High Valley
Dated 41311997
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Handwritten check register
Dated 10127
Cancelled check - Les Schwab
Dated 1112811997
Lo Go 5 Transit Mix Batch Plant Specifications
High Valley Concrete Time Cards
Dated 811612000
Schedule A to the Operating Agreement
Load Reports
Dated 8/3112001 - 11126/2001
High Valley Plant Diagram
Invoices
Cancelled check - BECO
Dated 11127/2001
Receipts
lnvoice from Lakeview Concrete
Dated 2/25/2000
lnvoice from Lakeview Concrete
Dated 113112000
OshKosh Truck Order
Dated 3/27/2001
Load Reports
Dated 91112001 - 211812002
ClTlEquipment Finance
Dated 7/28/2001
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Picture
Lease Agreement
Dated 311011998
Lease Agreement
Dated 311011998
Lease Agreement
Dated 311011998
Lease Agreement
Dated 311011998
Cancelled checks - Glendale Construction
Dated 2/6/2002
Commercial Tire Invoice
Dated 1/14/2002
Bill History - Glendale Ready Mix
Dated 11911999
Copies of check 5098 & 221 1
Dated 1213011998 & 1I711999
Copy of payment - Glendale Ready Mix
Dated 121111999
Employee Spreadsheet
High Valley Concrete Time by Job Detail
Dated 5/4/2006
Time Cards
Dated I1811999
Time Cards
Dated 121112000
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Time Cards
Dated 1011912001
Mileage - Nevada
Dated 1999
Correspondence from Glendale Construction
Copy of check # I 256, Correspondence & lnvoices
Dated 211 112002
Invoice & Checks - Glendale Construction
Dated 1Ol711999
lnvoices & Checks - Transport, Inc.
Dated 4110101
Lease Agreement
Dated 311011998
Deposit Summary
Dated 612112006
High Valley Concrete Vendor Spreadsheet & lnvoices
Letter from Glendale Construction to High Valley Concrete
Handwritten Calculations & Checks
Truck Rental to Glendale Construction Spreadsheet
Copy of Complaint - Valley Ready Mix vs. Cary Sargent, eta1
Computer Printout
Dated 2131200 1
Missing Vehicles Spreadsheet, lnvoice & Checks
Pictures
Gregg Whitmore Hours
Dated 8/31/2001
Handwritten Statement from Paul Gallup
Dated 211812002
Jackpot Job
High Valley Concrete Damage Summary
Insurance Payments
Missing Tools and Equipment
1999 Jackpot, Nevada Cost Sheet
Atomic City1 UGAKI-CCP
Invoices
Cary Sargent Schedule K-I
Dated 1998
Wells Fargo Bank Photocopy Request Notice
Dated 3/1/2002
KeyBank BusinessINon-Personal Signature Card
Dated 3/27/2002
KeyBank BusinesslNon-PersonalSignature Card
Dated 411711997
Check Stubs
Dated 11/26/2001
Return Envelope
Dated 3/20/2002
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Hill & Sons Excavating Statements
Dated 811511999
Glendale Construction, Inc. lnvoice & Check
Dated 2/18/2002
Letter from BECO to High Carey Sargent
Dated 2/28/2000
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging Summary
Dated 7/31/2001
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
Dated 1012000
Handwritten BECO Construction Order
Handwritten Note
lnvoices
Dated 1013112000
High Valley Concrete - 1997 Summary
KeyBank Statement
Dated 1/311998
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging Summary
Dated 913012001
High Valley Concrete Payment Record
Dated 711911998
Handy Wholesale Products lnvoice
Dated 6/7/2001
Wolf-Anchor-Rapp, Inc Letter to Jackie Gallup
Dated 812212001
Receipts
Screener Parts
Dated 612311999
Letter from Fuller & Carr to High Valley Concrete
Dated 611312001
High Valley Concrete Deposit Detail
Dated 112000
High Valley Concrete AIP Aging Summary
Dated 812012001
High Valley Concrete AIP Aging Summary
Dated 7/31/2001
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return
Dated 611997
High Valley Concrete AIR Aging Summary
Dated 1211511998
High Valley Concrete Open lnvoices by Customer
Dated 1113011998
Credit Application
Dated 311997
Compiled Financial Statements (B)
Dated 1013111998
Compiled Financial Statements (A)
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

Dated 1013111998
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 212811998
Compiled Financial Statements
Dated 12/31/1997
Compiled Financial Statements
Dated 1213111997 (Replaces April Issues)
Form 941-V Payment Vouchers
Dated 2002
Copies of Cancelled Checks
Dated 711111997
Pay Stub for Carey Sargent
Dated 312611999
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 12/31/1997
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
May - September 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - December 1997
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - August 1999
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
July 1999
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - April 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - August 1999
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - August 1999
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - December 1999
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January 2002
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January 1 - May 10,1999
Cancelled Checks
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 1213011997
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - September 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - April 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - December 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
March 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

May - September 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
May - September 2000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - December 2001
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - December 1998
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - December 1998
License Registration
Dated 11212001
Adjudication and Water Right Matters Disclosure Addendum
Dated 31411998
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
January - July 2001
List of Equipment
Copies of Checks
Dated 1211812001
w-2
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
May - September 2000
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return
Dated 1213111997
1999 W-2
Aggregate Data Sheet
Dated 9/21/2001
First Security Bank Analysis Charge
Employer Quarterly Unemployment Insurance Tax Report
Dated 413011999
Invoice
Dated 121611999
U.S. Partnership Return of Income
Dated 311011998
Letter from Fuller & Carr to Cary Sargent
Dated 111911999
Concrete Sales Spreadsheets
Dated 612511998
Letter from Fuller & Carr to High Valley Concrete
Dated 311512000
Letter from Fuller & Carr to High Valley Concrete
Dated 311512000
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
December 2000
High Valley Concrete Transaction Detail by Account
November 2001
High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
November 2001
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

High Valley Concrete Profit & Loss
September 2001
Handwritten Notes on Meeting with Doyle
Dated 212 112002
Handwritten Notes
Ownership Certificate for High Valley Concrete
Dated 41311997
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers
April 3, 1997
Ownership Certificate for High Valley Concrete
Dated 41311997
Signature Page
Dated 9/19/2001
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers
Dated 41311997
Schedule A to the Operating Agreement
Minutes of Special Meeting of the Managers
Dated 41311997
Annual Summary and Transmittal of U.S. Information Returns
Dated 2/24/2000
Ash Grove Cement Company Bill of Lading
Dated 4/1612001
Fax Cover Sheet - Cary Sargent to Bonneville
Dated 1211012000
Billy Park Hours
Dated 101612001
Gregg Whitmore Hours
Dated 9/1/01
First Security Debit & Copy of Check
Dated 1I12012000
1999 W-3 Transmittal of Wage & Tax Statements
Arnold Machinery Proposal
Dated 4/9/2002
Handwritten Note
High Valley Checks to Cary Sargent
Dated 811512000
2001 W-2's
2002 W-2's
2002 Form 941-V Payment Voucher
2000 Loan List
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 1113011998
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 11130/1998
Concrete Sales Spreadsheet
Dated 6/1/1998
High Valley Concrete YTD General Ledger
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Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

1/1/1998 - 12/31/1998
High Valley Concrete AccountQuickReport
Dated 81811998
Cancelled Checks
Dated 612011997
Cancelled Checks
Dated 6/14/1997
Cancelled Checks
Dated 11/24/1997
Robert Fisher Ins Agency Billing Statement & Check
Dated 411711997
Letter from Fuller & Carr to Cary Sargent
Dated 211211998
Handwritten Note
High Valley Concrete AccountQuickReport
Dated 1211811998
Handwritten note to Cary Sargent
Invoice to Cary Sargent
Dated 12/6/1999
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 1213111998
High Valley Concrete Balance Sheet
Dated 12/31/1998
Limited Liability Company Acknowledgment (unsigned)
Telecopy from Fuller & Carr to Cary Sargent
Dated 911411998
1997 U.S. Partnership Return of Income
Dated 3/10/1998
Deposit Summary (SEALED: CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT TO
PROTECTIVE ORDER) Dated 121612007

Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent
Sent

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
23'd day of September, 2008.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Cary Sargent

)
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), )
)
VS
)
)
Doyle Beck
)
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). )
)
Mark Fuller
)
Defendant )

Supreme Court No. 35312135313
Case No. CV2002-484
CV2007-118
AMENDED
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho
)
Limited liability company
)
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), )
)
v.
)
)
Cary Sargent and Glendale
1
Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corp
)
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). )
I, Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as
indicated:
NO
398
464
465

DESCRIPTION
No Exhibit 398 - Included one too many ProfitlLoss Labels
Picture
Computer Printout

SENTIRETAINED
Sent
Sent

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
17rd day of October, 2008.

Amesded Certificate of Exhibiis
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Cary Sargent

) Supreme Court No. 35312
Plaintiff(s)/Appellant(s), )
35313
)
VS
)
) Case No. CV2002-484
Doyle Beck
)
CV2007-118
Defendant(s)/Respondent(s). )
) Certificate of Service
Mark Fuller
)
Defendant )

1
)
High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho
)
Limited liability company
)
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), )
)
v.
)

1

Cary Sargent and Glendale
)
Construction, Inc., an ldaho Corp
1
Defendant(s)/Respondent(s). )

I, Abbie Mace, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record
and any reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:
Attorney
For Appellant - Cary Sargent
William D. Faler
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
PO Box 50130
ldaho Falls, ID 83405-0130
Certificate of Service
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Attorney
For Appellant - High Valley
Bryan D. Smith
McGrath, Meacham & Smith
414 Shoup Avenue
PO Box 50731
ldaho Falls, ID 83405

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this 23rdday of September, 2008.
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!,'!

..I

Abbie Mace
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy clerk'
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Cary Sargent

) Supreme Court No. 35312
Plaintiff(s)/Appellant(s), )
35313
)
VS
)
) Case No. CV2002-484
Doyle Beck
)
CV2007-118
Defendant(s)lRespondent(s). )
) Clerk's Certificate
Mark Fuller
)
Defendant )

1
1

High Valley Concrete, LLC an ldaho
)
Limited liability company
)
Plaintiff(s)lAppellant(s), )
)
v.
)

1

Cary Sargent and Glendale
)
Construction, Inc., an ldaho Corp
)
Defendant(s)/Respondent(s). )

I, Abbie Mace, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a
true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho
Appellate Rules.

I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted
in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along
with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record.

Clerk's Certificate
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court at St. Anthony, Fremont, Idaho, this 23" day of September, 2008.
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Abbie Mace 3 ,,-:
District Court ~ l e r $:.-
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